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REFORM
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Price-level, or “price-cap,” regulation offers an alluring alternative to
the traditional technique of monitoring a regulated firm’s profits. This
Article contrasts price-level regulation with conventional cost-of-service
ratemaking and with Ramsey pricing. Price-level regulation stands as a
market-based, incentive-driven “third way” between traditional regulation
and complete deregulation. Although some jurisdictions have set price
caps according to operating cost and rate-of-return calculations that clearly
parallel those steps in conventional ratemaking, this Article will focus on
price-level methodologies that combine an economy-wide measure of
inflation with an x-factor reflecting total factor productivity within a
regulated industry.
After addressing the simpler component of price-level regulation, the
choice of an inflation index, this Article devotes detailed attention to the
treatment of the x-factor by two federal ratemaking agencies, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). Closer examination of price cap
methodologies adopted by FERC and the FCC suggests that price-level
regulation based on inflation and an industry-specific X factor may be
*
Justin Smith Morrill Chair in Law, Michigan State University; Of Counsel, Technology
Law Group of Washington, D.C. This Article extends earlier work of mine on price-level
regulation. See Jim Chen, The Nature of the Public Utility: Infrastructure, the Market, and the Law,
98 NW. U. L. REV. 1617, 1668–79 (2004); Jim Chen, The Price of Macroeconomic Imprecision:
How Should the Law Measure Inflation?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1375, 1434–42 (2003). This Article’s
legal and economic analysis, however, differs considerably. Needless to say, so does its conclusion.
This Article’s title pays allusive tribute to STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM
(1982). I presented this Article at the George Mason University School of Law on December 17,
2014. Barbara Bean, Santanu Ganguli, Gil Grantmore, and Vivian Okere provided helpful
comments. Christian Diego Alcocer Argüello and Matthew Downer supplied capable research
assistance. Special thanks to Heather Elaine Worland Chen.
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further streamlined. This Article concludes by describing how price-level
regulation might be accomplished through the application of a single,
industry-specific index of input costs.
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INTRODUCTION

Conventional rate-of-return regulation richly deserves its derogatory
reputation as “the most speculative undertaking . . . in the history of
[Anglo-American] jurisprudence.”1 Rate regulation is a seemingly bootless
quest to set prices according to competitive market conditions that do not
exist and cannot emerge as long as a legal ratemaking apparatus remains in

1. West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 689 (1935) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
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place.2 In traditional public utility law, “the burden of intrusive regulatory
procedures and the risk of capture seem unavoidable.”3 Many pitfalls
plague the conventional technique of determining a rate-regulated firm’s
revenue requirement according to the sum of its prudently incurred
operating costs and a reasonable rate of return on investment. Almost all
of these ills can be traced to a fundamental informational asymmetry:
relative to regulators, firm managers enjoy vastly superior access to
information about the firm’s true costs and opportunities for profit.4
Price-level, or “price-cap,” regulation offers an alluring alternative to
the traditional technique of monitoring a regulated firm’s profits.5 Part II
of this Article contrasts price-level regulation with conventional cost-ofservice ratemaking and with Ramsey pricing. Price-level regulation stands
as a market-based, incentive-driven “third way” between traditional
regulation and complete deregulation.6
Part III provides formal specifications of price-level regulation.
Although some jurisdictions have set price caps according to operating cost
and rate-of-return calculations that clearly parallel those steps in
conventional ratemaking,7 this Article will focus on methodologies that
combine an economy-wide measure of inflation with an x-factor reflecting
total factor productivity within a regulated industry.
Part IV addresses the simpler component of price-level regulation, the
choice of an inflation index. Part V devotes detailed attention to the
treatment of the x-factor by two federal ratemaking agencies, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC). Although these agencies have never explicitly
cooperated, closer examination of price cap methodologies adopted by
2. See generally Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 548, 611–16 (1969).
3. JOSÉ A. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: MONOPOLY,
CONTRACTS, AND DISCRETION 243 (2003).
4. See Mark A. Jamison, Regulation: Price Cap and Revenue Cap, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ENERGY ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY 1245, 1247 (Barney L. Capehart ed., 2007).
5. For an overview of the technique, see JORDAN J. HILLMAN & RONALD R.
BRAEUTIGAM, PRICE LEVEL REGULATION FOR DIVERSIFIED PUBLIC UTILITIES: AN
ASSESSMENT (1989). For a sense of the controversy that the technique sparked upon its
introduction to the United States, compare Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Price Level Regulation Based
on Inflation Is Not an Attractive Alternative to Profit Level Regulation, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 665
(1990) with Jordan J. Hillman & Ronald R. Braeutigam, The Potential Benefits and Problems
of Price Level Regulation: A More Hopeful Perspective, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (1990).
6. See HILLMAN & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 5, at 698.
7. See, e.g., Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S.
679, 693 (1923); Ass’n of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC (Oil Pipe Lines II), 281 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
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FERC and the FCC suggests that price-level regulation based on inflation
and an industry-specific X factor may be further streamlined. Part VI
describes how price-level regulation might be accomplished through the
application of a single, industry-specific index of input costs.
II. PRICE-LEVEL REGULATION IN RELATION TO CONVENTIONAL
RATEMAKING AND RAMSEY PRICING
A. Curing Flaws in Conventional Ratemaking
Within the United States, a legal system accustomed to borrowing
heavily from English common law,8 price-level regulation is a decidedly
recent and statute-based British import. British regulators devised the
price-level strategy in the 1980s as a method for disciplining British
Telecommunications after privatization.9 In truth, the United States had
already collected extensive experience with similar regulatory mechanisms.
Maximum rates and price ceilings in American legal history are no younger
than the Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in the Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases,10 which upheld a price ceiling based on average-cost ratemaking.
Other American antecedents include the full-avoided cost pricing rule that
the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) prescribed for
cogenerators and small-power producers11 and the “new gas” price ceilings
imposed by the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA).12 PURPA and the
NGPA—both, coincidentally, enacted in 1978—intended their price
ceilings to invite new entry.13 That history is in harmony with the incentivebased motivation that underlies price-level regulation.

8. For merely one example of the influence of English common law on American
constitutional law, see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86–90 (1970). With respect to the
impact of common law on American statutes, see Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2724–
25 (2013); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 (1999). See generally, e.g., LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 4–5 (3d ed. 2005); 1 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW
IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM THE COLONIAL YEARS THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 48–51
(2012); Herbert Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L. REV. 6, 6–
7 (1910).
9. See MARK ARMSTRONG, SIMON COWAN & JOHN STUART VICKERS, REGULATORY
REFORM: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND BRITISH EXPERIENCE 165–94 (1994); GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ,
supra note 3, at 220–23; STEPHEN C. LITTLECHILD, REGULATION OF BRITISH
TELECOMMUNICATIONS’ PROFITABILITY (1983).
10. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
11. See generally Am. Paper Inst. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402 (1983).
12. See generally Mobil Oil Expl. & Prod. S.E., Inc. v. United Distrib. Cos., 498 U.S. 211
(1991).
13. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350; Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat 3117.
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Price-level regulation marks a conscious departure from conventional
cost-of-service ratemaking by emphasizing commodity or service prices
rather than the revenue required to sustain a publicly franchised firm.14 In
lieu of traditional restraints on the regulated firm’s profitability—which
force regulators to review the prudency of the firm’s operating costs, assess
the value of its productive assets, determine an appropriate rate of return,
and gauge the impact of taxes and depreciation, and allocate charges among
distinct customer classes15the price-level alternative entitles a regulated
firm to conduct its business as it sees fit, provided that its prices remain
below a certain level.16
These elements of conventional ratemaking are on full display in the
simplest formulation of the regulated firm’s revenue requirement17:
RR = r  B + OC + T
where18:
RR
r
B
OC
T

revenue requirement
rate of return
rate base (value of capital investments, net of depreciation)
operating costs
taxes

Price-level regulation addresses at least four of the most severe defects
in conventional, cost-of-service rate regulation.19 First, perverse incentives
arise from a profit-regulated firm’s ability to pass operating costs through to
ratepayers and to collect a return on all investment it can characterize as
“prudent.”20 The celebrated Averch–Johnson hypothesis posits that firms
guaranteed a “just and reasonable” rate of return will overinvest to the

14. Pierce, supra note 5, at 666.
15. Darin W. Kempke, Regulated Utilities, in 2 ACCOUNTANTS HANDBOOK: SPECIAL
INDUSTRIES AND SPECIAL TOPICS, at 36-6 to 36-11 (D.R. Carmichael & Lynford Graham eds.,
12th ed. 2012).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 54, 56–57 (D.C.
Cir. 1999); RICHARD E. MATHENY, TAXATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES § 2.04 (2014) (“The
Ratemaking Process”).
18. Williston Basin, 165 F.3d at 56–57.
19. See Nat’l Rural Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Policy &
Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786, 6791, 6853 & n.450 (1990),
on reconsideration, 6 FCC Rcd. 2637 (1991).
20. See Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d 239, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (observing that the recovery
of “all costs reasonably incurred in one period” gave “pipelines . . . perverse incentives to ‘goldplate’ facilities”); Nat’l Rural Telecom Ass’n, 988 F.2d at 178.
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extent that rate regulation shields them from the discipline of the
marketplace.21
Second, the impossibility of extending a regulatory scheme to all
business activities ostensibly within the reach of a natural monopolist22 gives
rise to that hoary practice of regulated firms, shifting money between
regulated and unregulated lines of business.23 Baxter’s Law, named after
the architect of the Bell breakup decree (William F. Baxter),24 posits that a
monopolist will “evade [rate] regulation by leveraging its market power
from the [monopolized] platform market into adjacent and
unregulated . . . markets.”25 Price-level regulation, in other words, blunts
the motivation that dominant firms might otherwise have to use rents from
imperfectly regulated lines of business to cross-subsidize their quest for
greater power over unregulated markets.
A crucial corollary of this principle is regulatory reform of funding for
universal service. Conventional ratemaking funds service to low-income
and/or high-cost customers through implicit subsidies embedded within
complex rate structures charging above-cost rates to those classes of
customers who were presumed capable of financing universal service.26 By

21. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962); Harold H. Wein, Fair Rate of Return and
Incentives─Some General Considerations, in PERFORMANCE UNDER REGULATION 39 (Harry
M. Trebing ed., 1968); Stanislaw H. Wellisz, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline Companies: An
Economic Analysis, 71 J. POL. ECON. 30 (1963). See generally W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M.
VERNON & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 387–91
(2d ed. 1995) (reviewing the literature addressing the Averch–Johnson hypothesis).
22. The impossibility of this task does not keep regulators from trying and trying again,
and failing each time. Compare, e.g., United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), with
ALBERT CAMUS, The Myth of Sisyphus, in THE PLAGUE, THE FALL, EXILE AND THE
KINGDOM, AND SELECTED ESSAYS 589 (Stuart Gilbert, David Bellos & Justin O’Brien eds.,
2004).
23. See, e.g., Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945); Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel.
Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930); City of Houston v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 259 U.S. 318 (1922); Sw. Bell
Corp. v. FCC, 896 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
24. See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d mem. sub
nom. California v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983), terminated by Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(a)(1), 110
Stat. 56, 143–44, reprinted in 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2012) (Applicability of Consent Decrees and
Other Law).
25. Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.
REV. 41, 71–72 (2003); see also Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine:
Applications in Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1249, 1249–50 (1999).
26. See generally Jim Chen, Subsidized Rural Telephony and the Public Interest: A Case
Study in Cooperative Federalism and Its Pitfalls, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 307, 318–
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commanding that universal service support be made “explicit,”27 the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 effectively banned the funding of
universal service through implicit cross-subsidies.28
In other words, cross-subsidization, whether achieved by dominant
firms exploiting gaps within conventional regulation or indulged by
regulators as part of their mission to ensure universal service, are
incompatible with the contemporary commitments to open entry and
competitive neutrality. Although price-level regulation does not directly
provide an explicit, competitively neutral mechanism for funding universal
service,29 price caps are, at an absolute minimum, compatible with
regulatory reforms designed to remove implicit cross-subsidies from filed
tariffs and other expressions of conventional ratemaking.30
Third, conventional rate-of-return regulation is, not to put too fine a
point on it, slow and expensive. As if to prove the regulatory command,
“Thou Shalt Not Optimize in Piecemeal Fashion,”31 the failure to complete
the transition from rate-of-return regulation to its price-level equivalent
leaves a firm free to “escape the burden of costs incurred in its unregulated
or price cap business by shifting them to [a] rate-of-return affiliate, which
can pass them on to ratepayers.”32 Allowing firms to choose between
inflation-based and valuation-based methodologies injects “an exciting new
twist” into rate regulation and “invites an enormous amount of
gamesmanship.”33 Abortive conversion from conventional ratemaking also
facilitates official misconduct, especially if regulators “arbitrarily switch
back and forth between methodologies in a way which require[s] investors

23 (2003).
27. 47 U.S.C. § 254(e) (2012).
28. See, e.g., Comsat Corp. v. FCC, 250 F.3d 931, 938 (5th Cir. 2001); Alenco Commc’ns,
Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608, 623 (5th Cir. 2000); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523, 537–38
(8th Cir. 1998).
29. For judicial observations on that regulatory goal, see Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 258 F.3d
1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2001); Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 418 (5th
Cir. 1999).
30. See Nat’l Ass’n of State Util. Consumer Advocates v. FCC, 372 F.3d 454, 457–58, 461
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
31. Gregory S. Crespi, Market Magic: Can the Invisible Hand Strangle Bigotry?, 72 B.U.
L. REV. 991, 1010–11 (1992); see also Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 641, 652 (1980) (“The general theory of second best demonstrates that if there are
distortions from competitive equilibrium throughout the economy due to taxes or monopoly,
for example, a change that can be viewed as value maximizing in one small sector may actually
decrease value overall.” (footnote omitted)). See generally R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster,
The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
32. Nat’l Rural Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
33. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

938

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[99:931

to bear the risk of bad investments at some times while denying them the
benefit of good investments at others.”34
Finally, price-level regulation promotes the efficient pricing of
individual products offered by a regulated firm. Although “[t]he most basic
idea in welfare economics and price theory is that it is efficient for a good to
be produced and consumed if the marginal cost of production is less than
the marginal benefit of consumption,” virtually every question of regulatory
rate design concerns circumstances in which “the fixed costs of production
must be recovered through raising prices above marginal costs.”35 Prices in
a regulated setting routinely exceed marginal cost because the firm
otherwise “will not be able to cover its fixed costs if it sets prices equal to
marginal cost.”36
B. Ramsey Pricing
Despite these virtues, price-level regulation may not offer an ideal
solution to the problem of optimal pricing. Outright deregulation, or at least
its closest regulatory equivalent, may outperform both conventional
ratemaking and its price-level alternative.37 Nearly a century ago,
economist Frank Ramsey proposed a pricing methodology that minimizes
the social loss from setting prices above marginal cost.38 When the
government imposes taxes on goods, it can best minimize those taxes’
distortion of consumption patterns (and therefore minimize the efficiency
loss from such taxes) by levying taxes in inverse proportion to the elasticity
of demand for each good. Later work, especially by Marcel Boiteux,
extended Ramsey’s insight from its original context in taxation to the
allocation of fixed costs in utility ratemaking.39
34. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 315 (1989). But see Verizon Commc’ns
Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 526 (2002) (failing to identify any constitutionally significant
“reliance interests” that would be “jeopardized by an intentional switch in ratesetting
methodologies”).
35. William P. Rogerson, New Economic Perspectives on Telecommunications
Regulation, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1489, 1491 (2000).
36. Id.
37. Cf. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1363 (1998) (describing the long-term trend of the
law of regulated industries toward “complete detariffing, elimination of all entry restrictions,
and outright abolition” of regulatory supervision).
38. See Frank P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927).
39. See Marcel Boiteux, Sur la gestion des Monopoles Publics astreints à l’équilibre
budgétaire, 24 ECONOMETRICA 22 (1956), translated in Marcel Boiteux, On the Management
of Public Monopolies Subject to Budgetary Constraints, 3 J. ECON. THEORY 219 (William J.
Baumol & David F. Bradford trans., 1971). See generally ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS
OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 137–41 (photo. reprint 1988) (1st ed. 1970);
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Ramsey pricing “in its pure form” often confounds regulators with
insurmountable “difficulties in getting the data needed.”40 Price-level
regulation overcomes this difficulty by effectively delegating cost allocation
decisions to the regulated firm.41 Armed with “an appropriate price cap
scheme,” a “regulator does not need to know demand elasticities to
implement Ramsey prices,” but rather “can induce the regulated firm itself
to choose Ramsey prices.”42 Price-level regulation thus contains its own
form of rate design. Common costs are assigned to customers whose
demand for utility service is the most elastic:
Ramsey pricing [is] designed for cases where marginal cost is
below average cost. Where that is true, a regulated firm forced to
sell at marginal cost cannot recoup its total costs. Under Ramsey
pricing, the regulator allows firms to charge each user a premium
over marginal cost in inverse proportion to the elasticity of the
user’s demand. Because the highest charges fall on the most
inelastic demanders, the impact on total usage is minimized.
Thus, . . . [Ramsey pricing] would reconcile the [regulated firm’s]
need for revenue to cover total costs with the least possible
distortion of demand . . . .43
Ramsey pricing is easy to articulate as a regulatory norm but notoriously
difficult to implement within political constraints on regulation.44 Formally,
the Lerner index measures a firm’s market power according to the
negative inverse of the price elasticity of demand faced by the firm.45
Setting rates according to the inverse of the price elasticity of demand
therefore gives legal effect to the regulated firm’s market power. Market
KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPTIMAL REGULATION: THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL
MONOPOLY 122–25 (1991).
40. Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. ICC, 985 F.2d 589, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also William B.
Tye & Herman B. Leonard, On the Problems of Applying Ramsey Pricing to the Railroad
Industry with Uncertain Demand Elasticities, 17 TRANSP. RES. 439 (1983).
41. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 66–67 (2000); Ingo Vogelsang & Jörg Finsinger, Regulatory
Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing by Multiproduct Monopoly Firms, 10 BELL J. ECON.
157 (1979).
42. Rogerson, supra note 35, at 1492.
43. Burlington N., 985 F.2d at 596.
44. For a flavor of ongoing debates over Ramsey pricing, see Egbert Dierker, The
Optimality of Boiteux-Ramsey Pricing, 59 ECONOMETRICA 99 (1991); Tae Hoon Oum &
Michael W. Tretheway, Ramsey Pricing in the Presence of Externality Costs, 22 J. TRANSP.
ECON. & POL’Y 307 (1988); William G. Shepherd, Ramsey Pricing: Its Uses and Limits, 2 UTILS.
POL’Y 296 (1992).
45. See Abba P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly
Power, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157 (1934).
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power, after all, is the power to control prices.46 In more colorful terms,
setting rates according to Ramsey pricing prices utility services according to
their value to the purchaser, and thereby allows the regulated firm to charge
“all that the traffic will bear.”47
The real world presence of inequality and the widely held political
instinct against exacerbating unequal distributions of wealth in favor of the
affluent hamper the complete implementation of Ramsey pricing. By
allowing “the highest charges [to] fall on the most inelastic demanders,”
Ramsey pricing prescribes a harshly regressive approach to rate regulation.48
The burden of high rates would fall most heavily on citizens who are least
able and least likely to find alternatives to utility services priced according
to Ramsey’s approach. This criticism of Ramsey pricing finds a nearly
exact parallel in defenses of progressive taxation.49 At an extreme,
Ramsey pricing may raise rates to such high levels as to create “the false
illusion that a government agency is keeping watch over rates, . . . when it is
in fact doing no such thing.”50
In the fierce battle over its Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost
Rule (TELRIC),51 the FCC rebuffed calls for Ramsey pricing of telephone
network elements that incumbent local exchange carriers were required to
46. E.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); accord
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); see also 47 C.F.R. § 61.3(q) (2016)
(defining a “[d]ominant carrier” as one “found by the [Federal Communications] Commission
to have market power (i.e., power to control prices)”).
47. See, e.g., INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM’N, PROPOSED ADVANCES IN FREIGHT
RATES BY CARRIERS, ICC Docket No. 3500, U.S. Doc. 5910, S. Doc. No. 61-725, at 4072–74
(1911) (describing the railroads’ proposed rule that would enable them to charge “all that the
traffic will bear”); cf. id. at 4119 (acknowledging that pricing carriage at rates that “the traffic
will bear” allows the railroad to extract the value of that service from the shipper). These
hearings by the Interstate Commerce Commission represented merely one chapter in the
United States government’s decades-long assault on the trans-Missouri and trans-Illinois
railroad trusts. See generally United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
48. Burlington N., 985 F.2d at 596.
49. See, e.g., Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 770
(1995); Jim Chen, Progressive Taxation: An Aesthetic and Moral Defense, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 659, 676–79 (2012); Richard A. Musgrave, Clarifying Tax Reform, 70 TAX NOTES 731,
733 (1996).
50. Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 474 F.2d 416, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 417
U.S. 380 (1974); accord Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1510 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
51. See generally Jim Chen, The Death of the Regulatory Compact: Adjusting Prices and
Expectations in the Law of Regulated Industries, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1265, 1292–95, 1305–13
(2006); Gregory L. Rosston & Roger G. Noll, The Economics of the Supreme Court’s Decision
on Forward Looking Costs, 1 REV. NETWORK ECON. 81 (2002); David E.M. Sappington, On
the Design of Input Prices: Can TELRIC Prices Ever Be Optimal?, 18 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y
197 (2006).
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sell to competitors on an unbundled basis, despite the endorsement of that
practice by academic commentators52 and at least one Supreme Court
Justice.53 A majority of the high court eventually concluded that Ramsey
pricing’s primary economic attraction “appears to be a drawback when [it
is] used as a method of setting rates for the wholesale market in unbundled
network elements.”54 Specifically, because entrants into local exchange
markets were expected to exhibit “highest” demand for “the costly
bottleneck elements, duplication of which is neither likely nor desired, high
lease rates for these elements would be the rates most likely to deter market
entry.”55
Price-level regulation therefore stands between the economically flawed
approach of conventional ratemaking and the politically fraught alternative
of Ramsey pricing.56 Its principal virtue lies in avoidance of conventional
ratemaking’s deepest pitfalls. At the same time, by imposing some ceiling,
or “cap,” on prices charged by a regulated firm, price-level regulation
largely escapes the usual allegations leveled against Ramsey pricing, that
setting prices inverse to elasticities of demand, even if technically
achievable, abdicates control over prices to monopolists and enables them
to charge all that the traffic will bear.57
Precisely how well price-level regulation navigates this third way
depends on its specification and its application to actual markets. I now turn
to this question.
III. SPECIFYING PRICE-LEVEL REGULATION
There are two strikingly distinct formulaic methods of specifying pricelevel regulation. I shall first dispense with the so-called forecast approach,
if only to recognize the similarities between this method and the
conventional ratemaking formula that price caps are purportedly designed
to displace. I will then focus on the method that commands the lion’s share
52. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons:
Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1081, 1109 (1997).
53. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 426–27 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging that the “FCC disfavors Ramsey
pricing, but” complaining that the agency “does not explain why a contrary judgment would
conflict with” the Telecommunications Act of 1996 “or otherwise be arbitrary or
unreasonable”).
54. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 515 (2002).
55. Id. at 515–16.
56. Compare, e.g., Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 54, 56–57
(D.C. Cir. 1999), with Ramsey, supra note 38.
57. See supra note 47.
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of this Article’s attention: price-level regulation through the application of
a general inflation index and an industry-specific measure of productivity.
A. The Forecast Approach
The forecast approach to price-level regulation proceeds in three steps.58
First, the regulator determines the rate base for the initial year t of pricelevel regulation by reference to some base year:
t 1

Bt 1  Bi   (Ci  Di )
i 1

where:
Bi rate base in year i
Ci capital expenditures in year i
Di depreciation in year i
Second, the regulator projects operating expenses and unit sales for each
year under the price cap. Third and finally, the regulator calculates a
weighted average cost of capital as the rate of return needed to finance the
price-capped firm:
nt



jt

PjQ

j

 OC

j

cj  d

(1  r )

j

j

Tj

 B t 1 

B nt
(1  r ) n

where:
n
PjQj
OCj
Tj
R

expected duration of the price cap
projected revenue for year j
operating expenses for year j
taxes for year j
rate of return—i.e., the weighted average cost of debt and
equity59

Despite its superficial complexity, the so-called forecast approach to
price-level regulation is quite faithful to the traditional cost-of-service
ratemaking formula for computing a regulated firm’s revenue requirement:

58. See generally RICHARD GREEN & MARTIN RODRÍGUEZ PARDINA, RESETTING
PRICE CONTROLS FOR PRIVATIZED UTILITIES: A MANUAL FOR REGULATORS 77–80 (1999);
Jamison, supra note 4, at 1247–48.
59. See GREEN & PARDINA, supra note 58, at 87–91 (describing different methods for
computing the rate of return); cf. Williston Basin, 165 F.3d at 57, 60–63 (describing the use of
discounted cash flow analysis to compute the cost of common equity as the most contentious
part of computing the “weighted average . . . of the three elements comprising” a regulated
firm’s “capital structure: long-term debt, preferred stock, and common equity”).
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RR = r  B + OC + T.60 Indeed, the forecast method so closely tracks
conventional ratemaking that it is better evaluated as a method for
transitioning what had previously been a government-owned enterprise
(such as British Telecommunications) to private ownership under
regulatory supervision.61 In the United States, which rarely encounters such
transitions from outright public ownership to regulation of a newly
privatized, shareholder-owned firm on a public utility model,62 there may be
no practically meaningful distinction between conventional ratemaking and
the forecast approach to price-level regulation.
B. Inflation Minus x-Factor
In order to distinguish itself from conventional ratemaking’s focus on
firm-specific revenue, price-level regulation must begin with an economic
baseline that is wholly independent of the firm’s historic costs and revenues
and likewise unconnected to regulatory forecasts of the rate of return
needed to attract and retain private investment in the firm. What this
Article will treat as true price-level regulation combines independent
benchmarks of prices with industry-specific adjustments of a regulated
firm’s freedom to raise prices in a given time period.
The success of price-level regulation often hinges on the computation of
its initial baseline.63 To the extent that an initial price cap is based on old
rates computed according to the historical cost of providing service, pricelevel regulation may not deliver significant gains vis-à-vis conventional

60. See GREEN & PARDINA, supra note 58.
61. See, e.g., ARMSTRONG, COWAN & VICKERS, supra note 9, at 165–94.
62. Rate regulation in the United States does address publicly owned and quasi-public
enterprises, inter alia, with respect to the United States Postal Service, see, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of
Greeting Card Publishers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 462 U.S. 810 (1983) (assigning to the Postal Rate
Commission the primary responsibility for setting postage rates under the Postal
Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 3622(b) (1982)), and the Bonneville Power Administration,
see 16 U.S.C. § 839e(a)(2) (1982) (setting rates within the Bonneville Power Administration so
“that such rates . . . are sufficient to assure repayment of the Federal investment in the Federal
Columbia River Power System over a reasonable number of years [and] . . . are based upon the
Administrator’s total system costs”); Alcoa, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 698 F.3d 774,
789 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that the “BPA must set rates ‘with a view to encouraging the
widest possible diversified use of electric power at the lowest possible rates to consumers
consistent with sound business principles,’” without being committed to “always charg[ing] the
lowest possible rates” (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 838g(1) (2006); California Energy Comm’n v.
Bonneville Power Admin., 909 F.2d 1298, 1307–08 (9th Cir. 1990))).
63. See Jeffrey I. Bernstein & David E.M. Sappington, Setting the X Factor in Price-Cap
Regulation Plans, 16 J. REG. ECON. 5, 9 (1999); Peter Navarro, The Simple Analytics of
Performance-Based Ratemaking: A Guide for the PBR Regulator, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 105, 128
(1996).
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ratemaking.64 Once an initial level has been set, an effective cap “require[s]
annual adjustments to the [firm’s] price cap indices for inflation and certain
‘exogenous’ changes outside the [firm’s] control, coupled with a percentage
offset for anticipated productivity gains.”65 The maximum allowable price
thus varies according to two adjustments: (1) upward, generally, as
prescribed by a gauge of general inflation, and (2) downward in anticipation
of the extent to which “the [regulated] industry [will] experience[] faster
productivity growth than the economy generally.”66
The following formula describes price-level regulation in algebraic
terms67:
Pt = Pb  (1 + π – x – z)t
where:
Pb
Pt
π
x
z

baseline price cap
price cap in year t after the onset of price-level regulation
inflation rate68
x-factor, sometimes called a “minimum productivity offset”69
a further adjustment for regulation-specific factors, sometimes
called a “consumer productivity dividend”70

If we relax the assumption that a price cap would remain constant over
a designated period before the agency adjusts its formula, we would do well
to restate this formula in even more general terms, one that allows annual
variation in all three parameters, π, x, and z:
t

Pt  Pb   (1  i  x i  zi )
ib

64. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 486 (2002); U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC
(USTA), 188 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Alfred E. Kahn, Timothy J. Tardiff & Dennis L.
Weisman, The Telecommunications Act at Three Years: An Economic Evaluation of Its
Implementation by the Federal Communications Commission, 11 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 319,
330–32 (1999); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and
Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 910 (2003).
65. Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
66. Id.
67. See Jeff D. Makholm, Elusive Efficiency and the X-Factor in Incentive Regulation: The
Törnqvist v. DEA/Malmquist Dispute, in THE LINE IN THE SAND: THE SHIFTING BOUNDARY
BETWEEN MARKETS AND REGULATION IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES 95, 97–98 (Sarah Voll &
Mike King eds., 2007). See generally id. at 107–10 (providing a full mathematical derivation of
the basic formula for price-level regulation).
68. By convention, economic literature designates inflation by the Greek letter π. In the
context of this Article, π does not designate the transcendental number associated with the
circumference of a circle or with trigonometric functions.
69. See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos., 79 F.3d at 1198.
70. Id.
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where i indicates an indexing variable and Pb indicates the baseline price
cap.
The foregoing three-parameter approach to price-level regulation is
evident in the rules of the Federal Communications Commission. The
FCC defines “[p]rice cap regulation” as a “method of regulation of
dominant carriers provided in [47 C.F.R.] §§ 61.41 through 61.49.”71
Dominant carriers are those “found by the Commission to have market
power (i.e., power to control prices).”72 The FCC calculates a “Price Cap
Index (PCI),” or an “index of prices applying to each basket of services
of each carrier subject to price cap regulation,”73 according to “the
following formula”:74

Z
PCIt  PCIt 1[1 w(GDPPI  X)  ]
R
where:
GDP-PI represents the “GDP Price Index,” or the “estimate of
the Chain-Type Price Index for Gross Domestic Product
published by the United States Department of Commerce.”75
X represents the productivity adjustment known as the x-factor.76
Z represents the “dollar effect of current regulatory changes when
compared to the regulations in effect at the time the PCI was
updated to PCIt–1, measured at base period level of operations.”77
R represents “[b]ase period quantities for each rate
element . . . multiplied by the price for each rate element . . . at the
time the PCI was updated to PCIt–1.”78
w = R + Z, all divided by R, with respect to the service baskets
subject to these Price Cap Index adjustments.79

71. 47 C.F.R. § 61.3(ff) (2016).
72. Id. § 61.3(q).
73. Id. § 61.3(ee).
74. Id. § 61.45(b)(1)(i).
75. Id. § 61.3(r).
76. Special Access for Price Cap Local Exch. Carriers (Special Access I), 27 FCC Rcd.
10,557, 10,563 (2012).
77. 47 C.F.R. § 61.45(b)(1)(i).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Shorn of its elaborations, the FCC’s Price Cap Index calculation takes
the form of the full three-parameter formula for price-level regulation:
Pt = Pb  (1 + π – x – z)t.80 The FCC has characterized its PCI mechanism
as serving three purposes, each corresponding to one of the parameters,
π, x, and z:
The PCI is designed to limit the prices LECs charge for service.
The PCI has three basic components: (1) a measure of inflation,
i.e., the Gross Domestic Product (chain weighted) Price Index
(GDP-PI); (2) a productivity factor or “X-Factor,” which
represents the amount by which LECs can be expected to
outperform economy-wide productivity gains; and (3)
adjustments to account for “exogenous” cost changes that are
outside the LEC’s control and not otherwise reflected in the PCI.81
Because exogenous costs are “‘in general those costs that are
triggered by administrative, legislative or judicial action beyond the
control of the carriers,’” z-factor “adjustments for such changes
presumably do not undermine the price caps’ incentive structures.”82
Other modifications of the basic price cap mechanism do reduce the
effectiveness of price-level regulation in adjusting the incentives of
capped firms. In specifying its price cap rules for dominant carriers, the
FCC has codified its historic sensitivity to the potentially regressive
redistributive effects of market-based regulation, which reach their peak
under Ramsey pricing but are not altogether absent under price caps.83
The FCC computes an “Actual Price Index (API)” based on “the level of
aggregate rate element rates in [each] basket” of distinctly priced
telephone company services.84 The FCC further divides each price cap
80. See sources cited supra note 67.
81. Special Access for Price Cap Local Exch. Carriers (Special Access II), 27 FCC Rcd.
16,318, 16,320 (2012) (footnotes omitted); see also Special Access I, 27 FCC Rcd. at 10,563.
82. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Policy and Rules
Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786, 6807 (1990), modified on
reconsideration, 6 FCC Rcd. 2637 (1991), further reconsideration dismissed, 6 FCC Rcd. 7482
(1991)).
83. See Special Access I, 27 FCC Rcd. 10,557.
84. 47 C.F.R. § 61.3(b) (2016); see also id. § 61.46. Specifically,
[a] price cap basket is a broad grouping of services, such as special access services.
Prices for services within a basket are limited by the PCI for the basket, which limits
the LEC’s pricing flexibility and its incentives to shift costs. To ascertain compliance
with the PCI, LEC rate levels within each basket are measured through the use of an
Annual Price Index (API). The API is the weighted sum of the percentage change in
LEC prices. The API weights the rate for each rate element in the basket based on
the quantity of each element sold in a historical base year. The historical base year is
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basket into service category bands and computes a “Service Band Index”
based on “the level of aggregate rate element rates in [each] service
category.”85
Although the use of baskets and bands enables the FCC to calibrate
price indexes according to the cost and demand characteristics of specific
services,86 these devices dilute the effectiveness of price-level regulation.87
Baskets and bands partially restore regulatory oversight of costs and
revenue on a firm-specific basis.88 The greater the departure from the
truly market-oriented aspects of price-level regulation, the lower the
regulated firm’s incentives to reduce costs and to innovate.89 Regulatory
directives ordering firms to share gains from price-level regulation with
their customers have perhaps the most negative effect on these
incentives.90 Acknowledging that sharing mechanisms designed to
capture the price-capped firm’s profits for its customers’ benefit do
“severely blunt[] the efficiency incentives of price cap regulation” and
reintroduce many of the distortions associated with conventional rate-ofreturn regulation, the FCC has eliminated sharing requirements in pricelevel regulation of local exchange carriers.91
Stripping away the z-factor and such artifices as baskets and bands
returns price-level regulation to adjustments conducted “solely for reasons
independent of the regulated firm’s actual behavior, notably (1) an annual
adjustment for general price inflation . . . and (2) an automatic annual
downward adjustment for expected improvements in firm productivity.”92
Omission of the z-factor reduces price-level regulation to a simpler two-

the calendar year that immediately precedes the annual tariff filing on July 1. A price
cap LEC’s rates are in compliance with the cap for a basket if the API is less than or
equal to the PCI.
Special Access for Price Cap LECs, 27 FCC Rcd. at 16,320 n.5 (citation omitted).
85. 47 C.F.R. § 61.3(oo); see also id. § 61.47.
86. See Nat’l Rural Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1993); 47 C.F.R.
§ 61.42.
87. See generally KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION 21 (1982).
88. Id.
89. See Nat’l Rural Telecom Ass’n, 988 F.2d at 178.
90. The sharing mechanisms that the FCC imposed through its earliest price cap orders
inspired numerous legal controversies. See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir.
1996); Nat’l Rural Telecom Ass’n, 988 F.2d at 180. By contrast, the D.C. Circuit has upheld a
price-cap scheme for cable television operators that omitted any sharing mechanism. See Time
Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 164–74 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
91. See USTA, 188 F.3d 521, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
92. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
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parameter specification,
∙ 1
.93 Or in an even more
general form that allows annual variations in inflation and total factor
productivity:
t

Pt  Pb   (1  i  x i )
ib

These specifications leave only two additional regulatory targets: the
rate of inflation (π) and an x-factor reflecting gains in total factor
productivity. Parts IV and V will address each of these factors in turn.
IV. CHOOSING THE INFLATION INDEX
As between the two primary tasks in price-level regulation, the choice
of an inflation index is at once less burdensome and less important.
Because inflation affects the national economy as a whole and is not
confined to a single industry within the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency
(let alone an individual firm subject to that agency’s oversight), an agency
such as FERC or the FCC must rely on extrinsic measures of price
changes across the entire economy.94
By the same token, the choice of an inflation index is likely to
command substantial attention, from capped firms as well as their
regulators, because inflation represents the primary force in price-level
regulation that drives prices upward.95 Precisely because an “inflation
index” represents a “factor[] outside of [entrepreneurial] control,” a
regulated firm should “have little incentive to shift costs from
nonregulated activities to regulated ones because it would not be able to
increase regulated rates to recapture those costs.”96
The proper measurement of inflation nevertheless presents a
nontrivial chore.97 Despite the prominence of inflation in all legal
subjects connected to economics,98 regulators have demonstrated a

93. See sources cited supra note 67.
94. See Jim Chen, The Price of Macroeconomic Imprecision: How Should the Law
Measure Inflation?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1365, 1403 (2003).
95. Bell Atl. Tel. Cos., 79 F.3d at 1198.
96. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 1994).
97. Cf. ROSENN, supra note 87, at 21 (“There are billions of prices in modern economies,
and there is no feasible method to monitor their constant movements.”).
98. See generally James Ming Chen, Indexing Inflation: The Impact of Methodology on
Econometrics and Macroeconomic Policy, 1 CENT. BANK J.L. & FIN. 3 (2014); Chen, supra note
94.
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surprising reluctance to adopt a firm measure of inflation.99 In judicial
review of administrative discretion, an agency’s failure to designate “an
appropriate index,” let alone the failure to explain “the proper
relationship between the appropriate inflation rate and the lower limit of
the zone of reasonableness” for regulated rates, is reversible error.100
To be sure, like any other form of “agency ratemaking, price cap
regulation . . . ‘involves policy determinations in which the agency is
acknowledged to have expertise.’”101 Moreover, “a reviewing court must
generally be at its most deferential” when an agency “is making
predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of
science.”102 But review of administrative decisions routinely requires
judges to “acquire the learning pertinent to complex technical questions
in such fields as economics, science, technology and psychology.”103
Judges “should not automatically succumb” to regulators’
“acknowledged expertise . . . overwhelmed as it were by the utter
‘scientificity’” of the ratemaking process.104 “Restraint, yes, abdication,
no.”105

99. See Chen, supra note 94, at 1405–07.
100. Ark. La. Gas Co. v. FERC, 654 F.2d 435, 443 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Farmers Union
Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1524 nn.71–72 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (observing that FERC
had failed to correlate changes in a rate base with inflation, whether measured by the CPI or
by the IPD).
101. WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 238 F.3d 449, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Time Warner
Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
102. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983);
see also, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980) (plurality
opinion); id. at 705–06 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Leventhal, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); cf. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S.
662, 670 (1981) (plurality opinion) (expressing a willingness to invalidate “marginally” effective
and “substantially” obtrusive state laws despite state officials’ claimed expertise over
regulations designed “to promote the public health or safety”); Queensboro Farms Prods., Inc.
v. Wickard, 137 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1943) (describing agriculture as a field “so vast that fully
to comprehend it would require an almost universal knowledge ranging from geology, biology,
chemistry and medicine to the niceties of the legislative, judicial and administrative processes
of government”).
104. Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1973); cf. Jackson v.
Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 787 (7th Cir. 2013) (Posner, J.) (identifying “a widespread, and
increasingly troublesome, discomfort among lawyers and judges confronted by a scientific or
other technological issue”); Edward K. Cheng, Fighting Legal Innumeracy, 17 GREEN BAG 2D
271, 276 (2014) (urging all “legal actors . . . to demand, without embarrassment, that
quantitative researchers not only explain the conclusions of their studies, but also how and why
the methods work”).
105. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 69 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
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There are two obvious candidates for measuring inflation. First, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), a division of the Department of Labor,
publishes the Consumer Price Index (CPI).106 The CPI is not a true costof-living index, but rather an estimate based on a market basket of goods
and services thought to represent average consumer spending.107 The
broadest version of CPI, the CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U),
reflects changes in the prices of all goods and services purchased for
consumption by urban households.108 Notably, even the BLS counsels
against the use of CPI as “a reliable measure of inflationary and
deflationary periods” because this gauge “includes volatile food and oil
prices.”109 The BLS also recognizes the CPI’s vulnerability “to sampling
error since it is based on a sample of prices and not the complete
average.”110
The United States’ second measure of inflation is the implicit price
deflator that the Bureau of Economic Affairs (BEA), a division of the
Department of Commerce, derives from its measurement of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP).111 The implicit price deflator reflects the
difference between the GDP’s nominal measure of changes in the market
value of goods, services, and structures produced by the entire United

106. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CPI DETAILED
REPORT: DATA FOR JANUARY 2014, at 221 (2014), http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid1401.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AV25-A9BG].
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All
Items Series, FRED, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/CPIAUCSL.txt [https://perma.cc/Y2MJW5FP] (last updated June 6, 2016) (summarizing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer
DEP’T
LAB.,
Price
Index:
Frequently
Asked
Questions
(FAQs),
U.S.
http://stats.bls.gov/cpi/cpifaq.htm#Question_13 [https://perma.cc/DX73-GW5C] (last modified
Dec. 2, 2015)); cf. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BLS HANDBOOK
OF METHODS ch. 17, at 4 (June 2015) [hereinafter BLS HANDBOOK OF METHODS, CHAPTER
17],
http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/homch17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5QEN-GAK2]
(observing that “many analysts” prefer the BLS’s series for All items less food and energy as a
more “useful” measure of “core inflation,” since it includes “[f]ood and energy” as “two of the
most volatile components of the CPI”).
110. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 109 (summarizing U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Consumer Price Index: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
http://stats.bls.gov/cpi/cpifaq.htm#Question_21 [https://perma.cc/NES9-YEEZ] (last modified
Dec. 2, 2015)); cf. BLS HANDBOOK OF METHODS, CHAPTER 17, supra note 109, at 6 (“The
CPI is estimated for a sample of consumer purchases; it is not a complete measure of price
change[, which requires that] all consumer transactions [be] covered.”).
111. See BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, NIPA HANDBOOK: CONCEPTS AND METHODS
OF THE U.S. NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS, at 2-15 & 4-22 (2014),
http://bea.gov/national/pdf/chapters1-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ4Y-XBLT].
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States economy and the computation of a “real” GDP that purports to
account for the impact of inflation on nominal GDP.112
The closely related Gross National Product (GNP) “measures the
market value of the goods, services, and structures produced by labor and
property supplied by U.S. residents,” including American investment
abroad.113 The GNP is therefore distinct from the GDP, which “cover[s]
activities that take place within the geographic borders of the United
States,” including foreign investment in this country.114 Accordingly,
“GDP measures the market value of the goods, services, and structures
produced within the nation’s economy.”115 Although the United States
officially switched from the GNP to the GDP as “the primary measure of
U.S. production” in 1991,116 the earliest implementations of price-level
regulation by American regulators relied upon the GNP.117 Vestiges of
this history remain in the rules of the FCC.118
The deprecation of GNP in the United States’ national income and
product accounts reduces the selection of an inflation index to a binary
choice between the CPI and the implicit price deflator of the GDP.119
Legislative and administrative sources of law both favor the CPI
(including CPI-U and all other variants) over the IPD as a measure of
inflation by a rough ratio of ten to one.120 In a rare flash of insight,
Congress indexed natural gas price ceilings under the Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978 according to the IPD (plus a 0.2% premium),121 evidently
aware that the CPI systematically overstated inflation relative to the

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id. at 2-6 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1-3 n.6, 2-4 n.29; Gross Domestic Product as a Measure of U.S. Production, 71
SURVEY CURRENT BUS., Aug. 1991, at 8, 8.
117. E.g., Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786,
6792–93 (1990), modified on reconsideration, 6 FCC Rcd. 2637 (1991), further reconsideration
dismissed, 6 FCC Rcd. 7482 (1991); accord Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
118. See 47 C.F.R. § 61.3(s) (2016) (defining the “GNP Price Index” for purposes of rate
regulation by the FCC); id. § 76.922(b)(2)(ii), (d)(2), (f)(4) (using the GNP Price Index to
adjust rates for basic and cable programming service tiers, to make quarterly rate adjustments,
and to account for external costs).
119. See Chen, supra note 94, 1402–09.
120. See generally id. at 1404–09.
121. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3311(a), 3314(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1988), repealed, Pub. L. No. 101-60,
§ 2(b), 103 Stat. 158, 158 (1989); Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing S.E., Inc. v. United Distrib. Cos.,
498 U.S. 211, 218, 221–22 (1991); Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Mid-La. Gas Co., 463 U.S. 319, 333,
334–35 & n.13, 342 (1983).
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IPD.122 Because the GDP is derived from the most comprehensive survey
of all transactions in the United States economy, and because the BEA
has consistently applied a chain-type, annual-weighted methodology that
the BLS has merely begun to explore on an experimental, legally
nonbinding basis,123 the implicit price deflator represents price-level
regulation’s unequivocally superior choice for measuring inflation across
the entire economy.
In cases involving price-level regulation, the reviewing court should
not hesitate to challenge a ratemaking agency’s decision to use a firm- or
industry-specific price index in lieu of the broadest available measure of
price change in the economy at large. At least where conventional rateof-return regulation still holds sway, the choice between the CPI and the
IPD should be a simple one. In traditional rate regulation, the
appropriate benchmark is the opportunity cost to the holder of a
regulated firm’s common stock of making that equity investment.124
Insofar as utility investors anticipate nothing more and nothing less than
being “better off by investing dollars in [the regulated firm’s] securities
than by buying real things at the time of investment,”125 the appropriate
inflation index for all traditional ratemaking applications is the broadest
available: the price deflator implied by the BEA’s computation of the
Gross Domestic Product.
There is, admittedly, at least one judicial precedent that arguably
counsels caution in applying GDP data to conventional ratemaking.126
Closer examination of Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. FERC,127

122. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1752, at 72–74 (1978) (Conf. Rep.); Steven M. Spaeth, The
Deregulation of Transportation and Natural Gas Production in the United States and Its
Relevance to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1990’s, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV.
43, 79 n.310 (1991).
123. See generally JULIE M. WHITTAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32293, THE
CHAINED CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: WHAT IS IT AND WOULD IT BE APPROPRIATE FOR
COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS (2013); Chen, supra note 98, at 22–24 (prepublication
offprint).
124. See Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679,
693 (1923) (“The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial
soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and economical management,
to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper
discharge of its public duties.”).
125. Robert A. Webb, Utility Rate Base Valuation in an Inflationary Economy, 28
BAYLOR L. REV. 823, 847 (1976).
126. Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 54, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
127. Id. at 63–64.
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however, confirms that decision’s support for the use of a broad measure
of economic growth in price-level regulation.128
In Williston, the D.C. Circuit reviewed a challenge to FERC’s denial
of a pipeline’s request for a rate increase under conventional cost-ofservice ratemaking.129 A central point of dispute on review was FERC’s
consideration of long-term growth in pipeline earnings as a component of
the return on common equity that Williston’s shareholders were entitled
to earn.130 FERC rejected an “industry-specific approach to long-term
growth estimates and adopted, as an alternative, ‘the long-term growth
rate of the economy as a whole, as measured by the gross domestic
product.’”131 In support of its embrace of GDP to support its evaluation
of its discounted cash flow (DCF) forecast of pipeline revenues, the
commissione reasoned:
[A]s companies reach maturity, their growth rates approach that
of the economy as a whole; [and] it is reasonable to predict that,
in the long run, a regulated firm will grow at the rate of an average
firm in the economy, because regulation will moderate
profitability in good and bad economic periods.132
The D.C. Circuit upheld FERC’s treatment of GDP data, at least to
the extent that “the Commission expanded the scope of its long-term
growth factor from the natural gas industry to the economy as a whole, as
reflected in the GDP.”133 The court characterized FERC’s “decision to
adopt an economy-wide approach” as “a well-reasoned and supported
outgrowth” of its “consideration [of] . . . the appropriate long-term
growth factor to be used in the DCF analysis.”134 Expressing “little doubt
that GDP is among the most commonly used and widely available
measures of economy-wide growth,” the court upheld “FERC’s decision
to expand the scope of its long-term analysis” to include GDP data.135

128. Id. at 64.
129. Id. at 56.
130. See id. at 59–60; cf. id. at 57 (citing NEPCO Mun. Rate Comm’n v. FERC, 668 F.2d
1327, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982), for the proposition that “[t]he
cost of common equity is frequently . . . a point of contention in rate making”); United States
v. FCC, 707 F.2d 610, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (observing that a regulated utility’s cost of equity
almost invariably exceeds its cost of debt).
131. Williston Basin, 165 F.3d at 59 (quoting Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. 79
FERC ¶ 61,311, at 62,387 (1997)).
132. Id. at 59–60.
133. Id. at 63.
134. Id. at 64.
135. Id.
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The court did remand for further consideration, however, in light of
FERC’s failure to explain why it chose to introduce potentially
contradictory “estimates of GDP created by different entities and based
on different economic assumptions,” all in response to a seemingly
unrelated “specific concern over the suitability of industryspecific . . . data for use in the DCF model.”136
The nugget of doubt in Williston therefore concerned the specific
relationship between GDP and industry-specific data bearing on longterm forecasts of growth in natural gas pipelines (particularly with respect
to disparities in pipeline revenues from selling gas as a commodity and
from transporting gas).137 Indeed, the ultimate goal in Williston, which
after all concerned conventional ratemaking for the transportation of
natural gas under section 4 of the Natural Gas Act,138 was to determine a
just and reasonable rate for a single pipeline.139 That exercise typically
accounts for inflation through conventional ratemaking’s computation of
the rate base.140 By contrast, the entire point of choosing GDP as the
measure of inflation in price-level regulation is to set an economy-wide
baseline against which to evaluate growth of productivity within a specific
regulated industry.141 That is the work of the x-factor. This Article now
turns to that subject.
V. DETERMINING THE X-FACTOR
A. The x-Factor as the Driver of Incentive-Based Regulation
The downward adjustment of a price cap via an x-factor is designed to
achieve the primary goal of price-level regulation: “provid[ing] better
incentives than rate-of-return regulation” by giving regulated firms
“opportunity to earn greater profits if they succeed in reducing costs and
becoming more efficient.”142 “The X-factor is aimed at capturing a
portion of expected increases in . . . productivity, so that these
136. Id.
137. See id. at 59.
138. See 15 U.S.C. § 717c (2012); Williston Basin, 165 F.3d at 56.
139. Williston Basin, 165 F.3d at 56.
140. See Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1523–25 (D.C. Cir.
1984); cf. id. at 1516–17 & n.64 (identifying the inflation-laden trap of the “front-end load,”
whereby an untrended cost rate base, which does not increase with inflation, systematically
declines over time as it depreciates, and prescribing a solution of “using a trended, inflationsensitive original cost rate base”).
141. Williston Basin, 165 F.3d at 63–64.
142. Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Webb, supra
note 125, at 847.
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improvements, as under competition, will result in lower prices for
consumers.”143 If properly computed, the x-factor “ensure[s] that price
changes reflect changing costs the same way as in competitive markets,”
by aligning “[c]hanges in industry prices” with “changes in industry
costs.”144
The x-factor is what distinguishes the prices of inputs and changes in
productivity within a regulated industry from parallel trends in the
broader economy.145 Because “changes in an individual firm’s prices
relative to its costs differ from an industry average” only to the extent that
the firm’s “productivity growth differs from the average productivity
growth of its industry,” the resulting “variation in profits” provides “the
carrot or stick” by which price-level regulation, through imitation of “the
competitive process[,] rewards efficiency gains.”146
As a matter of administrative law, the x-factor must bear some
relationship to a measure of productivity, lest the ratemaking agency “set
the X-factor arbitrarily and capriciously.”147 To establish a rational basis
for constraining the regulated firm to raise prices, regulators typically
begin by deriving a “minimum productivity offset” from historical trends
of long-term productivity growth in the regulated industry.148 More
precisely, this productivity offset “should be calculated as the sum of the
difference in productivity growth and the difference in input price growth
between the [regulated sector] and the economy as a whole.”149 This
calculation assumes “that historic productivity increases will be matched
in the future.”150

143. USTA, 188 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel
v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313, 319 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant
Carriers, 3 FCC Rcd. 3195, 3394 (1988).
144. Makholm, supra note 67, at 96.
145. See JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE K. YARROW, PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 296 (1989); Robert Loube, Price Cap Regulation: Problems and Solutions, 71 LAND
ECON. 286, 289–90 (1995); Ingo Vogelsang, Optimal Price Regulation for Natural and Legal
Monopolies, 8 ECONOMÍA MEXICANA, NUEVA ÉPOCA 5, 10 (1999).
146. Makholm, supra note 67, at 96; see also id. at 97 (describing the x-factor as part of “a
regulatory regime designed to limit monopoly utility prices . . . in a way that mimics the
constraints that a competitive firm would face”); Jeffrey I. Bernstein & David E.M. Sappington,
How to Determine the X in RPI-X Regulation: A User’s Guide, 24 TELECOMMS. POL’Y 63, 64
(2001).
147. Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel, 265 F.3d at 329.
148. See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
149. USTA, 188 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing In re Price Cap Performance
Review for Local Exch. Carriers, 12 FCC Rcd. 16,642, 16,680 (1997)).
150. Id.
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The x-factor is consciously designed to raise regulated firms’ incentive
to reduce cost and to pursue revenue-enhancing technological
improvements.151 The size of the x-factor, given its designation as the
minimum productivity offset, hinges on the extent to which regulators
believe that price-level regulation can spur efficiency gains through
technological and managerial change. A higher minimum productivity
offset represents a stronger commitment to technology forcing.
Whatever its intended purpose, the x-factor carries great practical
significance. In one 1999 case involving an FCC price cap, each 0.1%
change in the x-factor “represent[ed] a $23 million change in the industrywide access charge” collectible by local exchange carriers.152
Proper evaluation of the x-factor demands that this critical
component of price-level regulation be distinguished from legal
considerations that are not intended to affect the incentives of regulated
firms. Special care must be taken to distinguish true x-factors—namely,
those designed to track productivity gains within a regulated industry—
from other regulatory concepts.
In at least one instance, the FCC has used the term “X-factor” to
describe a price cap adjustment mechanism that bore no relationship to
industry-wide productivity.153 The FCC’s “CALLS Order” adopted a
separate pricing basket for special access services and purported to apply
a distinct x-factor to the special access basket.154 “Special access services
encompass all services that do not use local switches,” including “services
that employ dedicated facilities that run directly between the end user
and an interexchange carrier’s (IXC) point of presence, where an IXC
connects its network with the local exchange carrier’s (LEC) network, or
between two discrete end user locations.”155 More succinctly, “special
access is a dedicated transmission link between two locations, most often
provisioned via high-capacity circuits.”156
151. See Makholm, supra note 67, at 96 (describing how competition and its emulation
through price-level regulation “punishes firms that are slow to innovate, to reduce costs, or to
respond to consumer demands”).
152. USTA, 188 F.3d at 524.
153. See Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 15 FCC Rcd. 12,962, 12,974–75
(2000), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265
F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002).
154. See id. 12,974–75, 13,033–34.
155. Special Access II, 27 FCC Rcd. 16,318, 16,319 n.1 (2012).
156. AT&T Inc. & BellSouth Corp., 22 F.C.C.R. 5662, 5677 (2007).
Special access services—services that provide dedicated, high-quality data
connections—are a vital input to our broadband economy. Mobile providers use
these connections to link cell towers to wireline backbone networks. Banks, credit
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Unlike the x-factor adopted by the FCC in other contexts, the
purported x-factor adopted by the CALLS Order was “not a productivity
factor.”157 “Rather, it represented ‘a transitional mechanism . . . to lower
rates for a specified period of time for special access.”158 Of course, even
if a price cap adjustment is decoupled from any specific measure of
productivity, the agency must still “provide a rational explanation of how
it derived the precise percentage,” lest the agency be given “free reign
[sic] to set” this adjustment “arbitrarily and capriciously.”159
The computation of the x-factor must likewise be distinguished from
adjustments that are more appropriately characterized as z-factor
considerations. To complement downward adjustment of rates by the xfactor, regulators sometimes compute a “consumer productivity
dividend” reflecting the “greater productivity gains” realized solely by
virtue of the transition from rate-of-return regulation to the incentiveladen system of price-level regulation.160
Unlike the minimum
productivity offset, which reflects legal confidence that price-level
regulation will spur positive behavioral changes by the regulated firm,161
the consumer productivity dividend embodies the expectation that
moving from profit-level to price-level regulation will deliver consumer
benefits based solely on improvement in the regulatory process itself.162
The consumer productivity dividend thus represents gains expected from
behavioral changes by regulators.163
card, technology and insurance companies . . . use special access links to communicate
among their branch offices. . . . [T]hese services remain a $12–18 billion market
annually.
Special Access I, 27 FCC Rcd. 10,557, 10,641 (2012) (statement of Chairman Genachowski).
157. Special Access I, 27 FCC Rcd. at 10,564.
158. Id.; accord Special Access II, 27 FCC Rcd. at 16,321.
159. Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313, 329 (5th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002). “Free reign” is a common but embarrassing solecism for “free
rein.” See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY USAGE AND STYLE 193
(2005) (“Since giving free rein . . . is . . . granting control and power to another, it is not
surprising that [this] expression[] ha[s] been reanalyzed as free reign . . . , when the metaphor
evokes the power that a monarch has . . . . But the expression[] remain[s] properly free
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
rein . . . .”);
Free
Rein,
OXFORD
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/270005?redirectedFrom=free+rein#eid [https://perma.cc/8EZ
S-8VC4] (defining “free rein” as “a rein held loosely to allow a horse free motion; the freedom
that this gives a horse”); Catherine Soanes, Rein or Reign?, OXFORDWORDS BLOG (Mar. 26,
2012),
http://blog.oxforddictionaries.com/2012/03/rein-or-reign
[https://perma.cc/WXE2P5RE] (tracing confusion over these words to the decline of the horse in everyday life).
160. Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1204.
163. Id. at 1201.
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Any regulatory treatment of consumer productivity should be
regarded as an element of the z-factor and therefore distinguished from
evaluation of the x-factor. As time goes by and economic damage from
rate-of-return regulation recedes ever further in legal and managerial
memory, the idea that price-level regulation per se improves consumer
welfare becomes less tenable. Regulators who continue to include a
consumer productivity dividend must explain its retention.164
B. Three Pipelines and a Phone Call
The foregoing theoretical analysis must survive the vexatious task of
implementing price-level regulation in practice. To evaluate how federal
agencies and their reviewing courts have discharged this task, including
the pivotal computation of a productivity-based x-factor, I will examine
the final decade of FERC’s longstanding struggle to establish price
ceilings for oil pipelines. The D.C. Circuit’s Oil Pipe Lines trilogy,165
especially seen in light of an intervening decision by that court on a
seemingly unrelated price cap set by the FCC, offers tantalizing hints on
the possible streamlining of price-level regulation. The Oil Pipe Lines
trilogy and United States Telephone Ass’n provide legal support for
reducing price-level regulation from a two-step process (involving the
selection of an inflation index and the setting of an x-factor) into a single
step stressing solely the average level of input costs borne by a regulated
industry.
1. Oil Pipe Lines I
In passing the Hepburn Act of 1906, Congress subjected oil pipelines
to rate regulation.166 In four orders adopted during the early 1940s,167 the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) adopted the “fair value”
standard of Smyth v. Ames,168 albeit “without discussion, or even explicit
recognition, of alternative bases” for regulation.169 Despite the Supreme
164. See USTA, 188 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
165. Flying J Inc. v. FERC, 363 F.3d 495 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d 239
(D.C. Cir. 2002); USTA, 188 F.3d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Ass’n of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC (Oil
Pipe Lines I), 83 F.3d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
166. Pub. L. No. 59-337, 34 Stat. 584.
167. Reduced Pipe Line Rates & Gathering Charges, 272 I.C.C. 375 (1948); Minnelusa
Oil Corp., 258 I.C.C. 41 (1944); Petroleum Rail Shippers’ Ass’n v. Alton & So. R.R., 243 I.C.C.
589 (1941); Reduced Pipe Line Rates & Gathering Charges, 243 I.C.C. 115 (1940).
168. 169 U.S. 466 (1898); see id. at 546–47 (requiring the rate base to reflect the “fair
value” of utility property dedicated to public service).
169. Farmers Union Cent. Exch. v. FERC, 584 F.2d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 995 (1978).
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Court’s 1944 overruling of Smyth in Hope Natural Gas,170 the ICC never
updated its ratemaking methodology for oil pipelines.171
Upon the transfer of ratemaking authority from the ICC to FERC in
1977172 and a petition for review of a contested ICC rate order,173 the D.C.
Circuit found “little to rely on in constructing a theory of oil pipeline
ratemaking.”174 Taking special pains to identify “important economic
transformations” as well as “the significant changes in the relevant legal
environment since the ICC’s 1940’s decisions,”175 especially the rise of an
“inflationary economy wherein [regulatory] valuation typically exceeds
investment by a substantial amount,”176 the D.C. Circuit remanded the
case to FERC so that the newly empowered agency could determine its
own ratemaking methodology free of the ICC’s discredited precedent.177
On remand, however, FERC set price ceilings so high that, even by
the agency’s admission, they would “seldom [be] reached in actual
practice” and would allow oil pipelines to achieve “creamy returns.”178
Holding that FERC’s proposed methodology would flunk even the most
generously framed interpretation of the responsibility to set “just and
reasonable” rates,179 the D.C. Circuit vacated FERC’s rate order by
stating: “FERC set rate ceilings which, if reached in practice, would
admittedly be egregiously extortionate and then failed to demonstrate
that market forces could be relied upon to keep prices at reasonable levels
throughout the oil pipeline industry.”180 The Oil Pipe Lines trilogy took
place against this backdrop.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992181 directed FERC to adopt streamlined
procedures for setting oil pipeline rates.182 To comply with this mandate,
FERC adopted rates approved in the 1992 Act as a baseline for pricelevel regulation and set caps for future rate increases according to an
170. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944).
171. Farmers Union, 584 F.2d at 414.
172. See Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 402(b), 91 Stat.
565, 584 (1977), recodified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 60502 (2012).
173. See Williams Bros. Pipe Line Co., 355 I.C.C. 479 (1976).
174. Farmers Union, 584 F.2d at 413.
175. Id. at 414.
176. Id. at 415.
177. See id. at 422.
178. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
179. Id. at 1510.
180. Id.
181. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776.
182. See id. §§ 1801–04, 106 Stat. at 3010–12, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172 note (2012) (Oil
Pipeline Regulatory Reform).
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inflation index.183 This set the stage in 1996 for the first of two D.C.
Circuit cases styled Ass’n of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC (Oil Pipe Lines I).184
The court of appeals characterized FERC’s “indexed ratemaking
methodology” as one that would “enable pipelines to recover costs
by . . . rais[ing] rates at the same pace as they are predicted to experience
cost increases.”185
“Of central importance to the Commission’s scheme [was] its choice
of index.”186 Oil Pipe Lines I asked whether FERC’s oil pipeline rates
should have hinged on a narrow producer price index or, alternatively, on
a broader measure of prices throughout the economy of the United
States.187 The pipeline industry proposed the implicit price deflator
derived from the gross domestic product, which the D.C. Circuit
(correctly) described as “a macroeconomic indicator of overall inflation
in the economy.”188
FERC countered with what it called “PPI – 1%,” the producer price
index minus one percent.189 FERC derived this index from “a
macroeconomic measure of inflation” by using “a fixed-weight index of
commodity prices taken at the producer level” to track “price changes for
commodities that will not undergo further processing.”190 Although
FERC staff originally characterized the adoption of “an index one
percent lower than the PPI as ‘an offset for productivity,’” the D.C.
Circuit ultimately upheld the lowered index as “the most likely formula
to keep rates at their real value.”191 “[E]mpirical evidence in the record,”
said the reviewing court, “demonstrates that the application of the
PPI – 1% to the total pipeline rate . . . was a better historical measure of
pipelines’ cost experience” than other alternatives before FERC.192 The
ratemaking dispute in Oil Pipe Lines I thus centered on the choice
between a narrower producer price index and the broader implicit price
deflator.193
183. See Order No. 561, Revisions to Oil Pipeline Regulations Pursuant to the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,753 (Nov. 4, 1993), on reh’g sub nom. Order No. 561-A, 59
Fed. Reg. 40,243 (Aug. 8, 1994).
184. 83 F.3d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
185. Id. at 1430.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 1430 n.9; 1430 n.10.
188. Id. at 1430 & n.10.
189. Id. at 1430.
190. Id. at 1430 & n.9.
191. Id. at 1435.
192. Id. at 1436.
193. See id. at 1430 nn.9–10.

2016]

PRICE-LEVEL REGULATION AND ITS REFORM

961

The commission rejected the implicit price deflator principally
because of its breadth.194 The “GDP-IPD index,” it alleged, “directly
reflects rapid inflation in consumer services, such as health care,” which
oil pipelines buy “only indirectly, if at all.”195 Moreover, because the
implicit price deflator “reflects changes in the composition of the GDP at
large,” FERC complained that this index “is upwardly biased due to the
growing size of inflationary sectors of the economy,” especially health
care.196 The D.C. Circuit agreed.197 According to the court, the IPD’s
fatal flaw lay in the “fact that the [index] reflects changes in the relative
weights of different sectors of the economy,” which renders that index
“less accurate for cost changes within a single industry.”198
The court also took pains to distinguish FERC’s embrace of a PPIbased index from the commission’s earlier deployment of a broader
implicit price deflator in Buckeye Pipe Line Co.199 Buckeye had approved
an experimental program under which a pipeline would be relieved of
regulatory supervision of rates in markets where it lacked market power,
as long as prices charged did “not exceed[] the change in the GNP
deflator” since the rate was last increased, “plus two percent.”200 In other
words, Buckeye upheld the use of a GNP deflator + 2% price cap. If we
treat the GNP deflator as a measure of inflation, as the BEA did before
1991, Buckeye may be read as adopting an x-factor of minus 2%.
Confining Buckeye to the circumstances of “a pipeline without market
power,” the D.C. Circuit declined to allow that decision to impugn
FERC’s “different purpose[s]” in adopting “the indexing rate cap” at
issue in Oil Pipe Lines I.201
There is reason to believe that Oil Pipe Lines I misconstrued the
meaning of Buckeye. By endorsing a pricing experiment in Buckeye,
FERC moved toward deregulation before the passage of the Energy
Policy Act of 1992.202 In the oil pipeline and wholesale electricity markets,
FERC had begun to relax conventional rate-of-return regulation
194. See id. at 1434.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1435.
198. Id.
199. 53 FERC ¶ 61,473 (1990), on reh’g, 55 FERC ¶ 61,084 (1991).
200. 55 FERC ¶ 61,084. Buckeye and Oil Pipe Lines I took place on either side of the
United States’ decision to switch from Gross National Product to Gross Domestic Product as
its primary measure of national production. See generally supra Part IV and text accompanying
notes 114–18.
201. Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d at 1436.
202. 53 FERC ¶ 61,473 (1990), on reh’g, 55 FERC ¶ 61,084, 61,255 (1991).
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whenever a regulated firm could demonstrate the absence of market
power.203 By 1990, in the bulk electricity market, FERC had already
taken the more aggressive step of permitting purely market-based
prices.204 After the passage of the 1992 Act, FERC gradually adopted
market-based sales as a general policy in its regulation of wholesale
electricity markets.205 The presence of a price cap of any sort in Buckeye
suggests that FERC’s reform of oil pipeline regulation was conservative
relative to the agency’s revision of its approach to the electricity market.
Strictly as a matter of ratepayer protection, it is easy to understand
why the D.C. Circuit endorsed PPI – 1%.206 FERC chose an index that
would keep a tighter rein on oil pipeline rates.207 The Producer Price
Index appears to rise more slowly than either the IPD or the Consumer
Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), two broader indexes that
are alleged to be “upwardly biased due to the growing size of inflationary
sectors of the economy.”208 A quick look at price index reports compiled
by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis and the
Department of Labor’s BLS provides some hints supporting Oil Pipe
Lines I’s decision to affirm FERC’s PPI – 1% methodology.
Average annual change in any index may be computed according to
the following formula:
1

x  t b

x t b
xt
1   t  1
xb
x b 

where x represents the index value and subscripts t and b indicate,
respectively, the target and base years.209 From 1984 to 1996, the dozen
years between Farmers Union II and Oil Pipe Lines I in which the D.C.
Circuit gave FERC a second chance to devise a ratemaking methodology
for oil pipelines, general inflation outpaced the Producer Price IndexFinished Goods (the baseline in FERC’s PPI – 1% price cap) by almost
exactly 0.75% per year, 2.738% to 1.986%210:
203. Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d at 1431.
204. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc., 51 FERC ¶ 61,367 (1990).
205. See La. Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
206. See Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d 1424.
207. Id. at 1434.
208. Id.
209. See Chen, supra note 98, at 10.
210. All data analyzed in this paragraph and Table 1 are readily available online from
government sources. The Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov, reports the
implicit price deflator of the gross domestic product as part of its tables on National Income
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Table 1: Comparing the Implicit Price Deflator with the Producer Price
Index, 1984–1996
Year
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Average Growth

GDP-IPD
55.466
57.240
58.395
59.885
61.982
64.392
66.773
68.996
70.569
72.248
73.785
75.324
76.699
2.738%

PPI-FG
103.7
104.7
103.2
105.4
108.0
113.6
119.2
121.7
123.2
124.7
125.5
127.9
131.3
1.986%

A graphical presentation of this information shows how the slope of
the blue line, representing the implicit price deflator from 1984 to 1996,
rose more steeply than the red line, which represents the PPI-Finished
Goods index over the same period:
Graph 1: GPD-IPD Versus PPI-Finished Goods, 1984–1996

and Product Accounts. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov, reports the
Consumer Price Index and Producer Price Index.
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But the law does not allow regulators to shove rates downward simply
because they can. “[T]he principle that ‘lower is better,’” when presented
as “an argument that seems to have no end and little connection to any
stated purpose,” provides no basis for affirming a ratemaking decision.211
If regulators can be required (as they are) to justify any particular x-factor
as an “appropriate rate reduction measure,”212 then reviewing courts can
and should demand no less rationality in the choice of an inflation index.
2. Zwischenzug: United States Telephone Association
Three years after Oil Pipe Lines I, the D.C. Circuit more directly
confronted issues of indexing and x-factor computation, albeit in the
context of telephone rate regulation.213 In United States Telephone Ass’n
v. FCC (USTA),214 the D.C. Circuit reviewed a price cap that the FCC had
imposed on local exchange companies (LECs).215 The FCC computed the
x-factor “as the sum of the difference in productivity growth and the
difference in input price growth between the LECs and the economy as a
whole.”216 The FCC expected the x-factor to “provide a reliable measure
of the extent to which changes in the LECs’ unit costs have been less than
the change in level of inflation.”217
The D.C. Circuit translated the FCC’s approach into mathematical
terms: “X = U – L, where U is the ‘change in level of inflation,’ and L is
the change in the LECs’ unit costs.”218 Unit costs, whether realized within
a regulated firm or in the economy at large, change according to two
factors: changes in productivity and changes in input prices.219 Therefore,
L is readily conceptualized through the equation, “L = Δ% LEC input
price – Δ% LEC productivity.”220 Treating “‘change[s] in unit costs in the
economy as a whole’” as changes attributable to inflation yields a similar
expression for U: “U = Δ% U.S. input price - Δ% U.S. productivity.”221
“Substituting these values into the equation X = U – L, using ‘TFP’ for

211. Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d 239, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
212. Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313, 329 (5th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002).
213. 188 F.3d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 524.
217. Id. at 524 n.1.
218. Id. at 524–25 n.1. (citation omitted).
219. See id. at 525 n.1.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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productivity, and performing a little algebraic manipulation”222 of these
definitions of U and L yields two alternative ways of stating the X-factor:
X = (Δ% LEC productivity – Δ% U.S. productivity) + (Δ% U.S.
input prices – Δ% LEC input prices)
X = (Δ% LEC productivity – Δ% LEC input prices) – (Δ% U.S.
productivity – Δ% U.S. input prices)223
Each of these equations calculates the x-factor according to some
relationship between industry-specific and economy-wide factors. The
first equation defines x as the sum of (1) the difference between industryspecific and economy-wide productivity and (2) the difference between
economy-wide and industry-specific input prices.224 The second formula,
which the D.C. Circuit thought “more readily conceptualized,”225 defines
x as the extent by which industry-specific growth in productivity, relative
to growth in input prices, exceeds the extent to which economy-wide
growth outpaces economy-wide growth in input prices.226
But the court’s most provocative suggestion, by far, arose in its
consideration of the x-factor in light of the price cap’s simultaneous
consideration of inflation.227 Insofar as the FCC “also increase[d] the
cap” at issue in USTA “by general price inflation,” the combination of an
inflation-adjusted price cap and a productivity-sensitive x-factor
effectively “increase[d] the cap by the LECs’ estimated change in unit
costs.”228 Once a downwardly oriented x-factor is combined with a
generally upward adjustment for inflation, the approximate “net effect of
these adjustments is . . . to increase the cap by the LECs’ estimated cost
in unit costs.”229 As the D.C. Circuit concluded in USTA, “[i]t is
somewhat as if the overall adjustment (‘A’) were . . . A = U – X = U – (U
– L) = L.”230 Substituting the previous definition for L and combining it
with our original algebraic definition of price-level regulation231 allows us

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id.
See id. at 524–25.
Id.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 525 n.1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra text following note 67.
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to state the overall task of price-level regulation in extremely simple
terms:
P1 = Pb  (1 + Δ% utility input prices – Δ% utility productivity)
Or more generally:
Pt = Pb  (1 + Δ% utility input prices – Δ% utility productivity)t
And most simply of all:
Pt = Pb  (1 + L)t
To recast this final equation with a variable that does not reek of local
exchange companies and telecommunications law, I have taken refuge in
the Greek language. The obvious English letter, i, is fraught with
mathematical and economic meanings (respectively, the imaginary
square root of –1 and a variable that either counts items in a sequence or
representings the rate of interest). The Greek words ενέργεια (literally,
energy)232 and είσοδος (entrance)233 are often used to express the economic
notion of input.234 The letter epsilon, ε, has the unfortunate distinction of
designating errors or residuals in many mathematical specifications and
may not be ideally suited for indicating growth in a regulated industry’s
input costs. The most common Greek words designating industry,
βιομηχανία and κλάδου,235 seem more promising. Interestingly, both of
these words are evocative of life. English is filled with loanwords
incorporating the Greek root bio-, and the word clade designates a group
of living organisms characterized by some set of traits presumably
inherited from a common ancestor. Since beta, a measurement of
covariance in mathematical finance,236 will actually make an appearance
in this Article, I will settle for kappa, the first letter of κλάδου.
Therefore, once again:
Pt = Pb  (1 + κ)t
232. Energy, THE CLASSIC GREEK DICTIONARY: GREEK-ENGLISH AND ENGLISHGREEK (George Ricker Berry ed., 16th prtg. 1962) [hereinafter THE CLASSIC GREEK
DICTIONARY].
233. Entrance, THE CLASSIC GREEK DICTIONARY, supra note 232.
234. See,
e.g.,
Translate
Input
to
Greek,
BABYLON,
http://translation.babylon.com/english/to-greek/input/ [https://perma.cc/ETL2-RBYU] (last
visited June 18, 2016).
235. βιομηχανία, from the Greek βιο (“life”) and μηχανία (“machine”), Life & Machine,
THE CLASSIC GREEK DICTIONARY, supra note 232; κλάδου (lit. “branch”), Branch, THE
CLASSIC GREEK DICTIONARY, supra note 232.
236. See, e.g., infra Part VI.B.
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where κ represents the rate of change in input prices paid by a regulated
industry. Even more generally, so that we can relax the unrealistic
assumption that the rate of change in input prices would remain constant
over a stretch of time:
t

Pt  Pb   (1  i )
ib

The power of this conclusion bears close notice. A price cap adjusted
exclusively for changes in input prices paid by regulated firms would
operate exactly as a price cap that reflects separate adjustments for
general changes in prices throughout the economy and for productivity
growth within the regulated industry itself. Calibrating price-level
regulation solely according to changes in input costs borne by regulated
firms could eliminate what has been to date the unwieldy task of
computing an x-factor distinct from measures of price change, on either
an economy-wide or industry-specific basis. In other words, FERC’s
adoption of PPI – 1% in Oil Pipe Lines I came dangerously close to
regulatory brilliance, even though neither FERC nor its reviewing court
defended the PPI – 1% index as a productivity offset,237 much less by
reference to the conventional formula for price-level regulation.
3. Oil Pipe Lines II
FERC freely admitted that the methodology approved in Oil Pipe
Lines I was “not a choice for all time” and promised to “monitor the
index’s ability to track changes in pipeline costs and review the
appropriateness of its choice of index . . . every five years.”238 After
FERC’s first five-year review in 2000, it elected to adhere to the PPI – 1%
index.239 The Association of Oil Pipe Lines filed a new challenge to
FERC’s price ceiling.240
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Oil Pipe Lines II affirmed one crucial
aspect of FERC’s 2000 order and remanded the rest of the order for
clarification of its economic methodology.241 In measuring “actual cost
changes experienced by the oil pipeline industry,” FERC used a poorly
specified “floating-weight” methodology that combined the simple
237. See Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
238. Id. at 1430.
239. Order Concluding Initial Five-Year Review of the Oil Pipeline Pricing Index, 93
FERC ¶ 61,266 (2000).
240. Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d 239, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
241. See id.
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average of pipeline costs per barrel-mile, the volume-weighted average of
those costs, and the median of the pipeline cost distribution.242 Whatever
market-based justification FERC might have had for eschewing the
volume-weighted average of pipeline costs (the benchmark preferred by
the industry) was undermined by the agency’s failure to account for the
presence of distinct high-cost crude oil pipelines and lower cost “product”
pipelines carrying refined products.243 FERC could not articulate
rationales beyond unsupported desires to “create[] cost-controlling
incentives” and to lower rates, even to the point of pushing pipelines to
“imminent bankruptcy.”244
Although the court hinted that FERC might have been able to justify
its rejection of the pipelines’ preferred methodology on the basis of the
standard econometric critique that fixed-weight indexing ignores
substitution effects and overstates inflation,245 the court concluded that
FERC had “not actually rest[ed] its decision” on such a rationale.246 Oil
Pipe Lines II remanded for a full explanation of FERC’s cost
measurements, as well as the agency’s refusal to remove statistical
outliers and its unexplained abandonment of the use of net plant to
calculate return on investment and income taxes in the computation of
pipelines’ capital costs.247
Critically, however, Oil Pipe Lines II affirmed FERC’s decision to
retain its PPI – 1% indexing methodology.248 The Association of Oil Pipe
Lines proposed two adjustments that had the potential to “undermine the
case for PPI – 1.”249 First, the pipelines argued that the PPI – 1% ceiling
had been so successful in improving the entire industry’s productivity that
“any modeling of future costs” by FERC “should control for” the
242. Id. at 241–42.
243. See id. at 243.
244. Id. at 244.
245. Id. at 244–45.
246. Id. For standard explanations of the vulnerability of fixed-weight price indexes to
consumer substitution of cheaper for more expensive goods and services, see Marilyn E.
Manser & Richard J. McDonald, An Analysis of Substitution Bias in Measuring Inflation, 1959–
85, 56 ECONOMETRICA 909 (1988); Jack E. Triplett, Economic Theory and BEA’s Alternative
Quantity and Price Indexes, 72 SURV. CURRENT BUS., April 1992, at 49, 49–50; Allan H. Young,
Alternative Measures of Change in Real Output and Prices, 72 SURV. CURRENT BUS., April
1992, at 32, 35.
247. See Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d at 245–48; cf. Colo. Wild v. U.S. Forest Serv., 435 F.3d
1204, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (observing that a reviewing court “cannot substitute [its] views on
statistics (including skewed data and outlier analysis) for those of” an expert agency “and insist
that one measure or another be used”).
248. Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d at 248.
249. Id. at 247.
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“onetime cost savings” attributable to the introduction of price-level
regulation.250 Second, the pipelines proposed that FERC be required to
account “for anticipated future cost increases due to increased
environmental and safety regulations.”251
The D.C. Circuit rebuffed both adjustments.252 The court reasoned
that these proposals “essentially require FERC to perform the same
task—to predict how future cost changes may deviate from the historical
trend.”253 The court applauded FERC’s “refus[al] to engage in such
speculation.”254 In the court’s view, FERC had adopted “a purely
historical analysis and . . . adhered to it” in order to avoid “embroil[ing]
itself in the complexity and iffiness” of a “forward-looking
methodology.”255
In affirming FERC’s adherence to PPI – 1%, Oil Pipe Lines II took
special pains to distinguish the agency’s purely historical methodology
from the speculative “consumer productivity dividend” that the D.C.
Circuit rejected in United States Telephone Ass’n.256 Oil Pipe Lines II
endorsed FERC’s defense of PPI – 1% as coming the “closest of all the
indices considered . . . to tracking the historical changes in the actual costs
of the product pipeline industry.”257
The court contrasted this
justification for PPI – 1% with the 0.5% consumer productivity dividend
that USTA vacated.258 “We found unexplained” the FCC’s decision to
continue “lopp[ing] 0.5% off the historic trend line in anticipation of
special productivity gains expected to flow from the switch to rate caps,”
reasoned the court in Oil Pipe Lines II, “as the benefits of the one-time
shift could hardly be expected to go on forever.”259
A superficial reading of Oil Pipe Lines II suggests that the D.C.
Circuit disavowed its own evaluation of the FCC’s x-factor calculation in
USTA. But in reality Oil Pipe Lines II did no such thing. The D.C.
Circuit’s second encounter with FERC’s price cap for oil pipelines
established two principles. First, Oil Pipe Lines II confirmed the
characterization in Oil Pipe Lines I of PPI – 1% as a purely historical
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Id. (citing USTA, 188 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
Id. (citing USTA, 188 F.3d at 527).
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methodology, with no pretense to adjusting rates for productivity gains
within the pipeline industry.260
Second, and more important, Oil Pipe Lines II distinguished
PPI – 1% from the ill-fated consumer productivity dividend that failed to
survive review in USTA.261 Even though the FCC described the 0.5%
consumer productivity dividend as a component of its x-factor, that
adjustment is more properly evaluated as a z-factor element of price-level
regulation.262 Any adjustment purporting to reflect gains from price-level
regulation rather than economic changes endogenous to the regulated
industry should be attributed to the regulators themselves, and not to the
industry or any individual firm. That is the classic distinction between a
z-factor and an x-factor.263 As USTA recognized, purported gains from
regulatory transitions are just that—transitory—and should not be
incorporated, whatever its nomenclature, into the productivity-based,
technology-forcing component of price-level regulation.
4. Flying J and Its Aftermath
On remand from Oil Pipe Lines II, FERC revisited the cost
computation, outlier, and net plant accounting issues that the D.C. Circuit
had questioned.264 In Flying J Inc. v. FERC,265 the third and final
installment of the Oil Pipe Lines trilogy, FERC abandoned all of those
contested elements of its 2000 rate order.266 Indeed, to the chagrin of
shippers who thought that a defense of those “innovations following
remand” would have enabled FERC to retain “a price-cap index of
PPI – 1,”267 FERC “chose an index of plain PPI.”268
Flying J hinted that FERC’s indexing methodology might have been
vulnerable to more sophisticated attacks. But the reviewing court did no
more than taunt the shippers for failing to articulate or press more
effective economic arguments.269 It expressed bemusement that “no one
in the current litigation seems to advocate use of an index differing from

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 165–75.
See supra Part III.B.
Flying J Inc. v. FERC, 363 F.3d 495, 497–99 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
363 F.3d 495.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 498.
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PPI by fractions of a whole number.”270 Having invited either the agency
or an interested party in Oil Pipe Lines II to argue “that a fixed-weight
index is inferior to its floating-weight analog because the former fails to
account for substitution from high-priced to low-price [sic] goods over
time,”271 the D.C. Circuit in Flying J declined to address the issue on the
paper-thin rationale that the shippers had failed to raise the point on
appeal, despite having “raised the point before FERC on remand.”272
Finally, the court revealed its awareness of “an issue that is inherent
in cost and price indices.”273 The shippers complained that FERC had
chosen to base its index on oil pipeline volumes for 1994 rather than
1999.274 “At the heart” of this dispute, observed the court, lay “the
difference between the Laspeyres and Paasche methods” of indexing,
“with the former weighting elements on the basis of their share of the
total in the initial period, and the latter assigning weights based on endperiod shares.”275 The court acknowledged that “the Laspeyres index
tends to overstate . . . change” in quantities or prices “and acts as an
upper bound on the actual rate of change.”276 A Laspeyres index’s
retention of “the original weights . . . tends to conceal the extent to which
customers have . . . substitut[ed] away from goods with rising relative
prices towards those with declining relative prices.”277 By contrast, the
Paasche index “serves as a lower bound.”278 Observing that “the shippers’
perfectly orthodox critique of an initial-period index” had been “matched
by the equally orthodox critique of and end-period index,” the court
declined to declare “any of FERC’s methodological choices” to be
“erroneous and harmful.”279
In a parting shot at what it must have perceived as the petitioning
shippers’ lack of economic thoroughness, the court did observe that “[n]o
one appears to have advocated year-by-year weighting, which tends to
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 499.
274. Id.
275. Id. For a comparison of Laspeyres and Paasche indexes, see Young, supra note 246,
at 33, 42–43.
276. Flying J, 363 F.3d at 500.
277. Id. (citing PETER RICHARD GRENVILLE LAYARD & ALAN A. WALTERS,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 157 (1978)); cf. Steven D. Braithwait, The Substitution Bias of the
Laspeyres Price Index: An Analysis Using Estimated Cost-of-Living Indexes, 70 AM. ECON.
REV. 64 (1980).
278. Flying J, 363 F.3d at 500.
279. Id.
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split the difference” between the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes.280
Although the court did not elaborate further, there is a deep economic
literature on the development of chain-type, “ideal” indexes based on the
geometric mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes.281
FERC’s price cap decisions since Flying J—indeed, since the
beginning of the Oil Pipe Lines trilogy—have marked a steady retreat in
the stringency of the agency’s regulation of oil pipeline rates.282 To this
day, FERC pegs oil pipeline price caps to the Producer Price Index for
Finished Goods.283 After surrendering any claim that its original
PPI – 1% standard in Oil Pipe Lines I included a productivity
component,284 FERC in Oil Pipe Lines II confirmed the purely historical
ambitions of its PPI – 1% cap.285 Flying J upheld FERC’s retreat to PPI
simpliciter.286 In the five-year review cycle immediately following Flying
J, FERC reset its oil pipeline pricing index at PPI + 1.3%.287 FERC’s
current cap rests at PPI + 2.65%.288 True to the notion that a price cap
should apply across an entire industry, FERC has declined “to inquire
into the particular circumstances of every pipeline and selectively remove
pipelines that experienced cost changes due to one particular factor from
the data set used to calculate the index.”289 At the same time, despite the

280. Id.
281. See generally, e.g., IRVING FISHER, THE MAKING OF INDEX NUMBERS (1922);
Douglas W. Caves, Laurits R. Christensen & W. Erwin Diewert, The Economic Theory of
Indexed Numbers and the Measurement of Input, Output, and Productivity, 50 ECONOMETRICA
1393 (1982); W. Erwin Diewert, Exact and Superlative Index Numbers, 46 J. ECONOMETRICS
115 (1976). For an application of this debate to the determination of the x-factor in price-level
regulation, see Makholm, supra note 67, at 99–101. For an application of “a geometric mean
[to] exclude[] statistical outliers” in lieu of “an arithmetic mean (which does not exclude
outliers)” in an administrative law setting, Colo. Wild v. U.S. Forest Serv., 435 F.3d 1204, 1215
(10th Cir. 2006), see generally Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975, 990–91 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
282. See Five-Year Review of Oil Pipeline Pricing Index, 114 FERC ¶ 61,293 (2006).
283. See 18 C.F.R. § 342.3(d)(2) (2016).
284. Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d 1424, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
285. Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d 239, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
286. Flying J Inc. v. FERC, 363 F.3d 495, 497, 500 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
287. See Five-Year Review of Oil Pipeline Pricing Index, 114 FERC ¶ 61,293.
288. See Five-Year Review of Oil Pipeline Pricing Index, 133 FERC ¶ 61,228 (2010) (2010
Index Review Order), reh’g denied, 135 FERC ¶ 61,172 (2011) (2011 Rehearing Denial); see also
Notice of Annual Change in the Producer Price Index for Finished Goods, 147 FERC ¶ 61,125
(2014) (directing pipelines to multiply their indexed ceiling levels for July 1, 2013, through June
30, 2014, by 1.038858 to account for a rise in the PPI-FG index from 194.2 for 2012 to 196.6 for
2013, inasmuch as 196.6 ÷ 194.2 + 0.0265 ≈ 1.038858).
289. See 2010 Index Review Order, 133 FERC at ¶ 62,260.
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concerns articulated in Oil Pipe Lines II,290 FERC has never set separate
caps for high-cost crude pipelines and low-cost product pipelines.291
C. Oil and Water May Not Mix, but Pipelines Prices and
Access Charges Do
“And the end of all our exploring / Will be to arrive where we started
/ And know the place for the first time.”292 This cycle of D.C. Circuit
cases—a trilogy on FERC’s regulation of oil pipelines and an intervening
decision on an FCC price cap on access charges—appears to have ended
inauspiciously.
After being goaded into treating its newfound
responsibility under the Hepburn Act and Energy Policy Act with some
measure of seriousness, FERC retreated, from the inception of the Oil
Pipe Lines trilogy and to the present day, from a PPI – 1% ceiling with
abortive pretensions to the imposition of a productivity-based x-factor to
a PPI + 2.65% factor evocative of the “creamy returns” that the D.C.
Circuit refused to countenance in 1984.293 Along the way, Oil Pipe Lines
II distanced FERC’s oil pipeline regime from the one opinion, United
States Telephone Ass’n (USTA), that offered real promise for reform and
streamlining price-level regulation.
But we should not let the FCC’s misleading characterization of the
consumer productivity dividend at issue in USTA conceal that decision’s
enduring significance. USTA declined to endorse the FCC’s indefinite
inclusion of the consumer productivity dividend in the access charge price
caps.294 Although the FCC had described the consumer productivity
dividend as a component of the x-factor,295 closer examination confirms
that this adjustment was more appropriately evaluated as a component of
the parameter that the Commission’s own rules classify as a z-factor. For
of its tantalizing treatment of FERC’s PPI-based price caps, the Oil Pipe
Line cases never disavowed USTA’s suggestion that price-level regulation
may be conducted on the basis of a single index: changes in the input
prices paid by a regulated industry.296 That suggestion, coupled with
FERC’s enduring reliance on a variant of the Producer Price Index,
290. See Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d at 244.
291. See 2011 Rehearing Denial, 147 FERC at ¶ 62,024; 2010 Index Review Order, 133
FERC at ¶ 62,267.
292. T.S. ELIOT, FOUR QUARTETS 59 (Esme Valerie Eliot ed., 1971).
293. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
294. USTA, 188 F.3d 521, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
295. Id. at 524.
296. See generally Flying J Inc. v. FERC, 363 F.3d 495 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Oil Pipe Lines II,
281 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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invites closer reevaluation of price-level regulation. This Article now
turns to that final task.
VI. A STREAMLINED, SINGLE-INDEX APPROACH TO PRICE-LEVEL
REGULATION
A. Three, Two, One
The full specification of price-level regulation adjusts a price cap
according to a function of three parameters: the rate of economy-wide
inflation (π), an x-factor reflecting industry-wide gains in total factor
productivity, and a z-factor reflecting efficiency gains to the adoption of
price-level regulation:
Pt = Pb  (1 + π – x – z)t
The withering away of z-factor adjustments after an initial transition
reduces price-level regulation to a simpler two-parameter specification:
Pt = Pb · (1 + π – x)t
The Oil Pipe Lines trilogy demonstrated that the inflation index need
not be one reflecting price change in the economy at large (the implicit
price deflator of the GDP) or even price change in a market basket of
consumer goods and services (CPI), but rather a producer-oriented index
such as PPI.297 United States Telephone Ass’n showed that the difference
between a general measure of inflation and an adjustment for total factor
productivity within an industry is equivalent to an index of input costs for
that industry.298 π – x = κ, as it were. This matched pair of insights reduces
price-level regulation to a single-parameter exercise:
Pt = Pb  (1 + κ)t
where κ represents the rate of change in input prices borne by a regulated
industry. Even more generally:
t

Pt  Pb   (1  i )
ib

Decided at the end of the United States’ first decade of experience
with price-level regulation, USTA simplifies this legal chore in yet
another way. USTA demonstrated that z-factor adjustments are

297. See supra Part V.B.4.
298. USTA, 188 F.3d at 524.
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irrelevant to economic conditions outside a regulatory agency and are
legally unsustainable beyond the initial transition from conventional costof-service ratemaking.299 Elimination of z-factor adjustments reduces
price-level regulation to a binary choice.300 Regulators may continue to
adhere to the prescription that American authorities have endorsed for
the past quarter-century.301 That approach requires the choice of an
inflation index, followed by the careful determination of an x-factor.302
A formulaic alternative, which this Article has defended on the
precedential strength of USTA and the Oil Pipe Lines trilogy, would
collapse the choice of inflation index and the determination of the xfactor into a single step: the application of an index of input costs borne
by the regulated industry as a whole.303 Isolating a single, industryspecific cost index demystifies a transitional regulatory reform that
sometimes appears to have fallen victim to the name of its most distinctive
step. The x-factor remains mysterious in its origin and (judging by the
protests lodged against regulatory agencies that have tried to fix its
value)304 arbitrary in its ultimate determination and application.
The traditional two-parameter specification does boast at least one
countervailing virtue: Treating inflation and the x-factor as distinct
adjustments reminds regulators that the economic fate of individual firms
(including regulatory incentives to control costs and to innovate) lies two
steps removed from a price cap. To achieve any gains under price-level
regulation, a firm must beat the rest of its industry, which cohort’s
collective fate in turn depends on its relative position within the broader
economy. In other words, a firm wins under a price cap to the extent that
it beats its competitors and to the extent that its industry beats the rest of
the economy.
Under the two-parameter, inflation-minus-x model of price-level
regulation, the indisputable first step consists of choosing the broadest
available inflation index.305 The primary virtue of a broader index of price
change lies in its immunity from manipulation. No monopolist, regardless
of its size, can plausibly affect general price inflation throughout the
United States economy. A price cap’s ability to reduce or eliminate the

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

USTA, 188 F.3d 521.
See supra Part V.B.2–4.
See, e.g., Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
See discussion supra Parts IV, V.
See supra Part V.B.2.
See, e.g., supra Part V.B (discussing the Oil Pipe Lines trilogy).
Vogelsang, supra note 145, at 9–10.
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tendency of a regulated firm to be “dissuaded from cost cutting efforts”
under conventional cost-of-service ratemaking depends heavily on the
extent to which the cap is “disconnected from individual firm costs.”306
The central goal of price-level regulation, after all, is to measure total
factor productivity across an entire regulated industry, and emphatically
not on a firm-specific basis.307 Adjusting rates according to an index of
costs throughout the industry helps ensure that “no one [firm’s] cost
experience has much impact on the caps to which it is subject.”308
“[W]hereas fixing rate maximums on the basis of individual [firms’] costs”
can deter regulated firms “from adopting cost-reducing innovations,” the
“cost reduction” experience of any one firm under price-level regulation
“is unlikely to much affect the industry-wide index.”309
At the other extreme, it makes no sense whatsoever to set a price cap
according to a measure chosen specifically for its ability to reflect
individual firms’ costs. At worst, calibrating price-level regulation
according to the regulated firm’s actual costs or to some exogenous
measure purporting to measure those costs comes perilously close to
“permit[ting] [a] regulated compan[y] to select the rate of return index”
that offers it the most generous rates.310
Finally, using a broad measure of inflation discharges one of the core
obligations of public utility law in any of its guises—the need to ensure a
provider of infrastructure of an adequate return on investment.311 The
reasonable, investment-backed expectations of public utility shareholders
are based strictly on the opportunity cost of their investment in the
regulated firm.312
Nothing in contemporary regulatory reform
undermines the principle that a measure of general inflation is most
appropriate for protecting the expectations of utility investors.313 “Any
investor paying attention” to the evolving law of regulated industries
must “realize that he [cannot] rely indefinitely on traditional regulatory
306. Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d 239, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
307. See Loube, supra note 145, at 289; Makholm, supra note 67, at 97.
308. Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d at 247.
309. Frontier Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 452 F.3d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
310. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
311. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944); Bluefield
Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923); Chicago
v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 458 F.2d 731, 750–51 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
312. See generally Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV.
1535, 1549–59 (1999) (debunking the notion that constitutional concepts such as the
confiscatory ratemaking doctrine of Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), should provide
additional checks against innovative deregulatory techniques).
313. Webb, supra note 125, at 847.
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methods,” but must rather adjust to novel approaches.314 Because the
“Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies to the service of any
single formula or combination of formulas,”315 regulated firms “have no
vested interest in any particular [ratemaking] calculation.”316
Constitution and statutory ratemaking principles require that the
regulatory “determination of fair prices” be “based on reasonable
financial requirements of the industry.”317 Price-level regulation delivers
at least that much.
B. Beta, Data, PPI
The foregoing intuitions suggest that FERC has implemented an
administratively convenient but economically imperfect price-cap
methodology by pegging oil pipeline rates to the Producer Price Index. If
the Oil Pipe Lines cases are interpreted as disputes over the inflationary
component of a price cap, as opposed to the x-factor, then a casual critic
may perceive grounds for complaint. Basing a price cap on producer
prices instead of general price inflation undermines the primary purpose
of price-level regulation, which is to disentangle ratemaking from any
individual firm’s costs. To the extent that regulators rely on a price index
within the economic sway of a sufficiently large monopolist, a
coordinated group of firms, or even firms acting consciously in parallel,318
price-level regulation loses some of its power to enhance each regulated
firm’s incentive to cut costs and perhaps even to innovate.
Economic redemption of the Oil Pipe Lines trilogy and FERC’s price
caps, from the original PPI – 1% designation to their current PPI + 2.65%
incarnation, lies in USTA’s insight that the residue of a general inflation
index and an appropriate productivity offset for an industry is the rate of

314. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 528 (2002) (describing regulatory
discretion over rates as constrained solely by the “constitutional bar against confiscatory
rates”).
315. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942); accord
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776–77 (1968) (“[R]ate-making agencies are not
bound to the service of any single regulatory formula; they are permitted . . . to make the
pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances.” (quotation
omitted)).
316. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
317. Wisconsin v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 373 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1963); accord Duquesne
Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 315 (1989) (quoting Wisconsin v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 373
U.S. at 299).
318. Cf., e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549–50 (2007) (requiring more
coordination than even “conscious parallelism” as the basis for a cause of action under § 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
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change in that industry’s input costs.319 Neither FERC’s pipeline pricing
orders nor the D.C. Circuit’s opinions on review, standing on their own,
support the synthesis of inflation and x-factor calculation into a single
step.320 Under fire in Oil Pipe Lines I, FERC never again defended PPIbased indexing on x-factor grounds,321 and the D.C. Circuit affirmatively
upheld PPI – 1% as a strictly historical exercise.322
Indeed, the econometric record since 1984—whether measured
according to prices paid throughout the broader economy or according to
prices received by domestic producers of finished goods—demonstrates
that PPI-Finished Goods has come closer than even CPI-U, the BLS’
standard measure of inflation, to tracking the United States economy323:

319. See USTA, 188 F.3d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
320. See, e.g., Flying J Inc. v. FERC, 363 F.3d 495 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Oil Pipe Lines II, 281
F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 2002); USTA, 188 F.3d 521; Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
321. See Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d 1424.
322. Id. at 1445.
323. See supra note 210.
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Table 2: The Implicit Price Deflator, CPI-U, and
PPI-Finished Goods, 1984–2013
Year
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Average Growth

GDP-IPD
55.466
57.240
58.395
59.885
61.982
64.392
66.773
68.996
70.569
72.248
73.785
75.324
76.699
78.012
78.859
80.065
81.887
83.754
85.039
86.735
89.120
91.988
94.814
97.337
99.246
100.000
101.221
103.311
105.166
106.733
2.283%

CPI-U PPI-FG
103.9
103.7
107.6
104.7
109.6
103.2
113.6
105.4
118.3
108.0
124.0
113.6
130.7
119.2
136.2
121.7
140.3
123.2
144.5
124.7
148.2
125.5
152.4
127.9
156.9
131.3
160.5
131.8
163.0
130.7
166.6
133.0
172.2
138.0
177.1
140.7
179.9
138.9
184.0
143.3
188.9
148.5
195.3
155.7
201.6
160.4
207.342
166.6
215.303
177.1
214.537
172.5
218.056
179.8
224.939
190.5
229.594
194.2
232.957
196.6
2.823% 2.230%

Over this 29-year span, CPI-U grew at an annual rate of 2.823%, or
0.54% more than the 2.283% growth rate in the implicit price deflator of
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the GDP.324 That gap is a relatively modest reflection of much larger gaps
between these inflation indexes, which I have estimated elsewhere as
0.659% from 1974 to 2014325 and which the celebrated Boskin Report of
1996 pegged between 0.80 and 1.60%.326 What is even more striking is the
near equivalence of the IPD and PPI-FG.327 Both indexes, finished this
three-decade stretch in a dead heat, at 2.283 and 2.230%, respectively.328
Although the IPD outpaced the PPI-FG by roughly 0.75% a year from
1984 to 1996, the PPI-FG all but closed that gap between 1997 and 2013.329
The relationship among these indexes can be expressed in more
formal statistical terms. Pearson’s r is the standard measure of correlation
between two sets of data. When specified for an entire population rather
than a sample, Pearson’s correlation coefficient is designated as x,y:

x,y 

cov(x, y)

 x y

Beta is a measure of covariance. For any two sets of data, represented by
independent variable x and dependent variable y, beta for y is the ratio of
the covariance between the two data sets to the variance of x330:

y 

cov(x, y) cov(x, y)

var(x)
 x2

The mathematical relationship between beta and Pearson’s correlation
coefficient can be reduced to the verbal description of beta as “correlated
relative volatility”:

y   x,y
y 

 x cov(x, y)  x cov(x, y)



 x,y
y
 x2
y
 x y

324. See supra Table 2.
325. See Chen, supra note 98, at 9, 12.
326. See MICHAEL J. BOSKIN ET AL., COMM. ON FIN. U.S. SENATE, 104TH CONG., FINAL
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMISSION TO STUDY THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (Comm.
Print 1996), reprinted in GETTING PRICES RIGHT: THE DEBATE OVER THE CONSUMER PRICE
INDEX 5, 20–64 (Dean Baker ed., 1998). The advisory commission and its report were known
by the name of the commission’s chairman, Michael J. Boskin.
327. See supra Table 2.
328. See supra Table 2.
329. See supra p. 962.
330. See, e.g., Irwin Friend & Marshall Blume, Measure of Portfolio Performance Under
Uncertainty, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 565 (1970).
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In this instance, because IPD as BEA data and CPI-U and PPI-FG as
BLS data are reported according to differing scales, I rescaled IPD
according to an imputed 1984 value of 103.8 (the arithmetic mean of CPIU and PPI-FG for that year) before calculating beta. To wit:

cov( * ,q)
q 
var( * )
where π* represents IPD as the best available measure of inflation,
rescaled according to my best estimate of IPD’s value for 1984, and q
represents the target index in question, either CPI-U or PPI-FG.
The following table reports correlation coefficients and betas for CPIU and PPI-FG, relative to GDP-IPD, for the 1984 to 2013 test period:
Table 3: Correlation and Beta for CPI-U and PPI-Finished
Goods, Relative to the Implicit Price Deflator
Target Index
Pearson’s r
Estimated q

CPI-U
0.9996
1.3171

PPI-FG
0.9806
0.9161

The very high correlation coefficients for both CPI-U and PPI-FG,
relative to IPD, express the extremely close relationship among all three
indexes. Since CPI-U, unlike PPI-FG, purports to measure inflation, it
should be unsurprising that Pearson’s r for CPI-U relative to IPD is
relatively closer (by a tiny margin) than r for PPI-FG, and extremely close
to 1 in absolute terms.
Of greater interest is beta for each of these indexes. Beta reveals how
CPI-U and PPI-FG each covary with the implicit price deflator as the best
available measure of inflation. The beta for CPI-U, at 1.1912, very closely
tracks the 16.5% gap between CPI-U and the IPD as measures of inflation
from 1984 to 2013. Beta for PPI-FG is nearly equal to 1. That measure’s
covariance with the IPD was nearly perfect.
A graphical presentation of these three indexes provides even more
vivid visual evidence of the relationships between them, especially the
critical link between the IPD and PPI-FG:
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Graph 2: Comparing the Implicit Price Deflator, CPI-U, and
PPI-Finished Goods, 1984–2013

CPI and PPI data, both being products of the BLS, are reported on a
scale where 100 designates their value in 1982.331 On the graph above, the
BLS scale is reported on the left axis. CPI-U, in red, and PPI-FG, in gold,
are directly comparable. In 1984, both of these BLS-reported indexes
were close to their 1982 base value of 100.332 By 2013, the 18.3% gap
between those indexes after twenty-nine years is readily apparent.333 As
a product of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the IPD is reported on a
scale where 100 designates its value in 2009.334 That scale is reported on
the right axis.335 The congruence between PPI-FG and the IPD is less
apparent, but still may be perceived through the rough parallelism of the
blue IPD line and the gold PPI-FG line.
Indeed, replotting IPD for 1984 through 2013 on a 1984 base value of
103.8 (halfway between that year’s value for CPI-U and PPI-FG) reveals
not only the similar rate of growth in IPD and PPI-FG over those three
decades, but also these indexes’ greater covariance:

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

See supra Graph 2.
See supra Table 3.
See supra Graph 2.
See supra Table 3.
See supra Graph 2.
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Graph 3: A Normalized Comparison of the Implicit Price Deflator,
CPI-U, and PPI-Finished Goods, 1984–2013

It is now more visually apparent how CPI-U grew steadily larger than
the IPD from 1984 to 2013, while PPI-FG fell behind the IPD in the first
half of this period but caught up in the latter half.336 On the basis of this
adjustment in the plotting of GDP-IPD data, I calculated betas for CPIU and PPI-FG relative to the IPD.
Without truly intending any such revision of price-level regulation—
indeed, despite its affirmative disavowal of any intention beyond purely
historical reporting of pipeline costs—FERC may have stumbled onto a
price cap methodology that is as practically workable as it is theoretically
sound. The Oil Pipe Lines trilogy echoes one of the grandest cycles in the
law of regulated industries. The notorious “fair value” rule of Smyth v.
Ames337 entitled a regulated firm to demand “a fair return upon the value
of that which it employs for the public convenience.”338 Although “[i]n
theory the . . . fair value standard mimics the operation of the competitive
market,” inasmuch as “investments . . . [whose] benefits exceed their
costs . . . reward[] [utilities] with an opportunity to earn an ‘above-cost’

336. See supra Graph 2.
337. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
338. Id. at 547.
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return,”339 practical difficulties plagued the valuation of property whose
owners bear legal obligations unknown in other segments of the
economy.340 The purely historical “prudent investment” rule arose as an
economically deficient but administratively convenient alternative.341
In its most recent pronouncement on the constitutional limits on rate
regulation, the Supreme Court declined to demand “rigid [enforcement]
of the prudent investment rule” and thereby “foreclose a return to some
form of the fair value rule just as its practical problems may be
diminishing.”342 In an age where secondary markets provide economic
signals historically obscured by command-and-control regulation and
overwhelming amounts of data are collected and distributed, the purely
historical instinct underlying the prudent investment rule and the Oil Pipe
Lines trilogy may and should give way to superior information and fully
considered economic judgment.
The availability and reliability of economic data needed to index price
caps should dictate the path of reform in price-level regulation. Theory
leaves little doubt that producer cost information across the entirety of a
regulated industry could facilitate a single-parameter, one-step approach
to price-level regulation. The practical question is whether any version
of Producer Price Index data or any other index can facilitate singleparameter price-level regulation.
C. Chain-Type Price Indexes for Purchased Inputs by Industry
The Producer Price Index and its variants provide a good starting
point, though probably not a perfect solution. The general PPI reported
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics would require two modifications before
it could be used as a measure of industry-wide input costs.343 First, the
PPI is designed to “measure[] average changes in prices received by
domestic producers for their output,” not changes in prices paid by
producers.344 Second, the relevant index would not be the main PPI, but
a subindex tailored according to a specific industry.345 The historic depth
339. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308 (1989).
340. See id. at 309.
341. See Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 291 (1923)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
342. Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 316 n.10.
343. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BLS HANDBOOK OF
METHODS ch. 14, at 1 (June 2015) [BLS HANDBOOK OF METHODS, CHAPTER 14],
http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/homch14.pdf [https://perma.cc/XU3C-8DH6].
344. Id. at 1.
345. Cf. id. at 4 (“A Producer Price Index for an industry is a measure of changes in prices
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of the data may also be less than ideal. For instance, BLS’s producer price
index for telecommunications reaches back no further than 2003.346
Nevertheless, the quest for price indexes that reflect conditions even in
highly volatile industries such as information technology is at least as old
as price-level regulation itself.347 The development of an index focusing
solely on regulated firms’ input prices seems within the reach of a
reasonably competent regulatory agency.
Indeed, BLS’s counterpart within the Department of Commerce, the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, has devised chain-type price indexes for
purchased service inputs across a wide range of industries.348 This is
precisely the type of producer cost index that could provide the value of
κ (or at least inform its computation) in a single-parameter,
Pt = Pb  (1 + κ)t approach to price-level regulation. Among the industryspecific input price indexes that the BEA has calculated, three are strong
candidates for use in price-level regulation: “utilities,” “pipelines,” and
“broadcasting and telecommunications.” The following table reports
BEA data, available since 1997, for those three industries and their
relationship to the implicit price deflator of the GDP:

received for the industry’s output sold outside the industry (i.e., its net output).”).
346. See id.
347. See, e.g., James Sinclair & Biran Catron, An Experimental Price Index for the
Computer Industry, SURV. CURRENT BUS., Oct. 1990, at 16.
348. See BLS HANDBOOK OF METHODS, CHAPTER 14, supra note 343, at 9.
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Table 4: Comparing the Implicit Price Deflator with IndustrySpecific Price Indexes for Utilities, Pipelines, and
Broadcasting/Telecommunications Companies, 1997–2013
Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Average
Annual Growth
Implied x-factor
=π–κ
Beta

78.012
78.859
80.065
81.887
83.754
85.039
86.735
89.120
91.988
94.814
97.337
99.246
100.000
101.221
103.311
105.166
106.733

81.052
81.261
81.997
84.945
86.463
87.106
89.059
91.346
95.029
98.396
101.148
104.403
100.000
102.968
104.784
106.815
108.791

70.655
72.257
74.041
76.473
77.754
80.044
81.845
86.528
91.231
94.225
96.035
100.297
100.000
102.123
105.733
108.448
110.036

Broadcast/
Telecom
90.149
89.941
90.524
91.501
92.014
91.559
92.560
93.361
94.626
96.708
96.999
99.209
100.000
101.173
102.359
104.213
105.677

1.978%

1.857%

2.807%

0.998%

0.122%

-0.829%

0.980%

0.9232

1.2868

0.4915

GDP-IPD Utilities Pipelines

2016]

PRICE-LEVEL REGULATION AND ITS REFORM

987

And in graphical form:
Graph 4: Comparing the Implicit Price Deflator with Industry-Specific
Price Indexes for Utilities, Pipelines, and
Broadcasting/Telecommunications Companies, 1997–2013

These indexes show that input costs borne by producers in the
utilities, pipelines, and broadcasting and telecommunications industries
varied widely from each other and, more to the point, from economywide inflation from 1997 through 2013.349 The average annual rates of
growth varied from a low of 0.998% in broadcast and telecommunications
to a high of 2.807% for pipelines.350 Because a single agency, BEA,
reports all of these indexes, they share a base year of 2009.351 The slope
of each index’s curve in the graph above reveals the rate of growth.352
And the relationship of each industry’s cost index to the IPD (indicated
by the blue curve) is readily seen.353
An industry-specific measure of input costs immediately reveals the
x-factor that regulators would compute in a two-parameter version of
price-level regulation. Since κ = π – x, it follows that x = π – κ. A slower
rate of growth in input costs within an industry, such as broadcast and
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
See supra Graph 3.
See supra Graph 3.
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telecommunications, implies a relatively high x-factor.354 Had the FCC
consulted BEA’s input cost index for broadcasting and
telecommunications in any of its price cap proceedings, that index would
have provided support for fixing the x-factor in the neighborhood of 1%.
Industries influenced by Moore’s law should be dynamic355—and be
assigned correspondingly aggressive x-factors reflecting their gains in
total factor productivity.
By contrast, if input costs are outpacing inflation, as they did for
pipelines, the x-factor will be negative.356 BEA data suggest that the xfactor for a price cap on pipelines from 1997 to 2013, a period roughly
contemporaneous with the Oil Pipe Lines trilogy, should have been
approximately –0.829%.357 Since PPI-FG has already been shown to
closely track the IPD, a weighted average of FERC’s adjustments relative
to PPI should approximate the x-factor latent in that agency’s oil pipeline
price cap.358 From 1996 to 2002, FERC used PPI – 1%. From 2002 to
2006, PPI prevailed.359 FERC’s 2006 rate order adopted PPI + 1.3%;360 its
2010 order has directed PPI + 2.65% ever since.361 A weighted average of
those rates yields an implied x-factor of –0.544%. The weighted average
for the twelve years following Oil Pipe Lines II is –1.317%. The x-factor
implied by BEA data on pipeline input costs (–0.829%) falls comfortably
between those two figures. Although FERC and the D.C. Circuit would
disavow the notion, the PPI-based price cap for oil pipelines has
implemented—in practice if not in legal form—a negative x-factor
commensurate with rising costs in that industry, particularly for crude oil
transport.362
Most intriguingly of all, perhaps, beta for each of the three industries
corresponding to one of the BEA’s input cost indexes spans a range from
0.4915 for broadcast and communications to 0.9232 for utilities and 1.2868
for pipelines.363 Because IPD and the industry-specific input indexes are
354. See supra Table 4.
355. See generally Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated
Circuits, ELECTRONICS MAG., Aug. 1965, at 4.
356. See supra Table 4.
357. See supra Table 4.
358. See supra Table 2.
359. See Five-Year Review of Oil Pipeline Pricing Index, 114 FERC ¶ 61,293 (2006).
360. See id.
361. See 2010 Index Review Order, 133 FERC ¶ 61,228 (2010), reh’g denied, 2011
Rehearing Denial, 135 FERC ¶ 61,172 (2011); see also Notice of Annual Change in the
Producer Price Index for Finished Goods, 147 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2014)
362. See supra Table 4.
363. See supra Table 4.
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reported on the same scale, beta can be calculated straightforwardly as
the ratio of (1) each index’s covariance relative to IPD to (2) the variance
of the IPD.364 Greater input inflation in the pipeline industry corresponds
not only with a negative x-factor for that industry, but also greater beta.365
The reverse is true for broadcasting and telecommunications.366
Unsurprisingly, the utilities category—presumably corresponding to
electricity and water, commodities whose demand tends to rise and fall
with the broader economy—represented the industrial clade whose costs
most closely tracked the gross domestic product of the United States and
whose beta was closest to unity.367
Adoption of a single-parameter, Pt = Pb  (1 + κ)t approach has the
final theoretical virtue of harmonizing price-level regulation with
portfolio theory,368 particularly the capital asset pricing model that has
proved so influential in the setting of rates of return (particularly return
on equity) under conventional ratemaking.369 An early criticism of pricelevel regulation alleged that price caps raised the betas of entire industries
subjected to what, two or three decades ago, was a novel legal practice.370
Studies conducted for the World Bank in the 1990s found that
infrastructure firms subject to price caps had higher betas than their
counterparts awarded a regulated rate of return.371 Higher beta, ceteris
paribus, signals the need for a higher rate of return, especially on equity,
to attract investment in a more volatile, presumably riskier company.372
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

For a specification of the formula for beta, see supra note 330.
See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
See generally JAMES MING CHEN, POSTMODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY:
NAVIGATING ABNORMAL MARKETS AND INVESTOR BEHAVIOR (2016).
369. See, e.g., AEP Tex. N. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 609 F.3d 432, 434–37, 439–44 (D.C.
Cir. 2010); Connect Am. Fund, 28 FCC Rcd. 7123, 7146–69 (2013); Represcribing the
Authorized Rate of Return for Interstate Servs. of Local Exch. Carriers, 5 FCCR 7507 (1990);
A. Lawrence Kolbe, Michael J. Vilbert & Bente Villadsen, Measuring Return on Equity
Correctly, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 1, 2005, at 23.
370. See Ian Alexander & Timothy Irwin, Price Caps, Rate-of-Return Regulation, and the
(World
Bank
Grp.,
D.C.),
Oct.
1996,
Cost
of
Capital,
VIEWPOINT
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11604/multi_page.pdf?sequenc
e=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/2VZ4-HENZ].
371. See id.; Ian Alexander, Colin Mayer & Helen Weeds, Regulatory Structure, Risk, and
Infrastructure Firms: An International Comparison (World Bank Policy Research, Working
Paper No. 1698 Nov. 30, 1999), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=620633 [https://perma.cc/92536X94].
372. See, e.g., Robert A. Korajczyk, Introduction to ASSET PRICING AND PORTFOLIO
PERFORMANCE: MODELS, STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE METRICS, at xiii, xv (Robert A.
Korajczyk ed., 1999); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium
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In price-level regulation, higher beta in input costs relative to the baseline
of general inflation signals an industry whose costs are growing faster
than those in other sectors of the economy,373 and therefore one that
needs to charge higher prices to customers and to pay higher returns to
investors in order to survive.
The betas reported here are distinct from the stock market betas
evaluated by the World Bank. My relevant benchmark is neither the
universe of publicly traded companies or the “investments in other
business undertakings which are attended by . . . risks and uncertainties”
comparable to public utility companies.374 Rather, I emphasize the
relationship between the input costs in industries deemed suitable for
price-level regulation and price change in the broader economy.
In financial markets, beta provides the simplest measure of investment
risk that cannot be managed by mere diversification.375 It is a measure of
systematic risk. In a two-stage process for setting a price cap, the x-factor
serves the function of identifying the extent to which the regulated
industry systematically differs from the broader economy.376 An industryspecific index of input costs performs the same function, as one might
expect of a parameter that is equivalent, conceptually if not exactly in
practice, to a broad measure of inflation, minus total factor productivity
unique to that industry.377
After the application of either (1) a general measure of inflation,
adjusted by an industry specific x-factor or (2) an cost index that isolates
industry inputs from the rest of the economy, what remains are those
drivers of risk and reward that are idiosyncratic to the individual firm.378
That is precisely the room for managerial discretion that price-level
regulation should be creating. The single-parameter model of price-level
regulation properly aligns beta with a rising index of input costs within an
industry,379 and with it the expected cost of capital needed to attract
investment in an industry whose costs are outstripping inflation.
Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 427–28 (1964).
373. See supra Table 4.
374. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 263 U.S. 679,
692 (1923); accord Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
375. See, e.g., William F. Sharpe, A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis, 9 MGMT. SCI.
277, 281 (1963); Jack L. Treynor, How to Rate Management of Investment Funds, 43 HARV.
BUS. REV. 63, 66 (1965).
376. See VICKERS & YARROW, supra note 145; Loube, supra note 145, at 289–90;
Vogelsang, supra note 145, at 5, 10.
377. See supra Part V.B.2.
378. See Friend & Blume, supra note 330, at 561.
379. See id. at 562–64.
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VII. CONCLUSION
“[N]either law nor economics has yet devised generally accepted
standards for the evaluation of rate-making . . . .”380 Even at its best,
public utility regulation “will always [raise] . . . embarrassing question[s]”
of indeterminacy and inefficacy.381 As a consciously transitional
regulatory tool, price-level regulation continues to strive toward bridging
conventional rate-of-return regulation with outright deregulation.382
Intense controversy over this technique suggests that price-level
regulation has not “significantly reduce[d] the burden of regulatory
proceedings” relative to the old rate-of-return methodology.383 Battles
over inflation indexes, “the productivity offset and allowable exogenous
costs” suggest that “price caps do not eliminate gamesmanship” from
regulation.384 Paradoxically, contrary to the expectation “that price cap
regulation will result in lower administrative costs” by lowering the need
for “direct [governmental] oversight,” regulatory commissions in states
applying price caps are twenty-five percent larger than commissions in
states adhering to conventional rate-of-return regulation.385
The
substitution of price-level regulation for its rate-of-return alternative has
represented the regulators’ own “strategic response . . . to maintain
relevancy in the volatile and uncertain environment” that has swamped
many industries formerly subject to command-and-control oversight.386
Despite these blemishes in execution, “it is arguably better to take the
risk of capture” and other defects inherent in discretionary regulation
“with price cap than with cost-of-service regulation, especially where
efficiency incentives are important.”387 By enabling regulators to
“control[] the prices of dominant firms” while leaving “control of their
profits . . . to the competitive marketplace,” price-level regulation has
proved “most effective as a transitory step on the path toward total
deregulation and full competition.”388 In the three decades since its

380. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790 (1898); accord Duquesne Light
Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308 (1989).
381. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898); accord Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308.
382. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 3, at 219.
383. Id. at 242.
384. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 487 (2002); see also USTA, 188 F.3d
521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
385. Jason R. Abel, Entry into Regulated Markets: The Development of a Competitive
Fringe in the Local Telephone Industry, 45 J.L. & ECON. 289, 311 (2002).
386. Id. at 309.
387. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 3, at 243.
388. Ronald R. Braeutigam & John C. Panzar, Effects of the Change from Rate-of-Return
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introduction, price-level regulation has become the dominant form of rate
regulation in Great Britain and the United States.389 By 2002, no fewer
than forty-eight states had adopted price-level regulation as their default
method for regulating incumbent local exchange companies.390 Although
critics continue to question whether price-level regulation provides
adequate “incentives for capital investment,”391 its infusion of “stronger
incentives to improve efficiency” demands that “price cap . . . be judged
a great success.”392
With good reason, the Supreme Court has characterized price-level
regulation as the mostly successful “final stage in a century of developing
ratesetting methodology.”393 As this Article has shown, the progressive
streamlining of price-level regulation, from an elaborate variation on the
theme of conventional ratemaking to a three-, two-, and finally singleparameter exercise in patrolling utility prices according to price indexes
beyond the control or influence of any regulated firm. The emergence of
price indexes for inputs purchased across entire industries, from
transporters of petroleum and natural gas to conveyors of electricity and
text messages, heralds the final and potentially most productive phase in
the transformation of price-level regulation.

Regulation to Price-Cap Regulation, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 191, 197 (1993).
389. See Ingo Vogelsang, Incentive Regulation and Competition in Public Utility Markets:
A 20-Year Perspective, 22 J. REG. ECON. 5 (2002); cf. Christopher R. Knittel, Regulatory
Restructuring and Incumbent Price Dynamics: The Casse of U.S. Local Telephone Markets, 86
REV. ECON. & STAT. 614, 615 (2004).
390. See David E.M. Sappington, Price Regulation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS: STRUCTURE, REGULATION AND COMPETITION 225
(Martin Cave et al. eds., 2002).
391. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 3, at 241.
392. Id. at 240.
393. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. United States, 535 U.S. 467, 487 (2002).

